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Chapter 1 
 
General Introduction 
 
 
“Two scotch, three beers and a coke please.” Ordering a couple of drinks in a bar is, at 
least for some people, a regular everyday life event. Although generally the requested 
drinks will be served, those of us who have been in a bar frequently know that this is 
not always the case. There are actually two things that can go wrong: The waiter may 
forget that there was an order altogether or the waiter may remember that something 
was ordered, but fails to accurately recall the specific drinks. In the former case 
customers might end up being really thirsty and in the latter case customers may end 
up with a brandy, two sprites, and an orange juice. The fact that waiters may 
sometimes confuse or forget orders suggests that keeping in mind to serve some 
drinks to a specific table may not be as straightforward as it seems on first sight. 
Indeed, taking into consideration that there are usually many tables, hundreds of 
possible drinks, and numerous previous orders that have already been served (and 
hence should be forgotten), the rare mistake by a waiter is no longer very surprising. 
It seems a miracle that under such circumstances waiters manage to serve the 
requested drinks most of the time.  
This example is meant to illustrate that keeping in mind a small amount of 
information about what to do (i.e. an intention) is often not as undemanding as it 
seems. Nonetheless, in most cases people (such as waiters) are successful in executing 
their intentions correctly. This observation is the starting point of this dissertation. 
That is, we wonder how people succeed in maintaining an intention accurately in 
memory when the possibilities of confusion are abundant. Was it coke or sprite, 
brandy or scotch, orange juice or beer that should be served? While serving the wrong 
drinks may look as a minor problem, confusing names of people you meet or which 
medicine to take may have more aversive consequences. 
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In the present dissertation we will concentrate on the following question: What 
psychological process is involved in maintaining an accurate representation of an 
intention in memory in demanding situations? We will investigate how memory 
operates to ensure that we will not get confused about what to do. In this chapter we 
start out with a brief overview of the place of the subject under study in the literature. 
Then, we will provide working definitions and theorizing that form the basis of the 
experiments we develop. In addition, we will attempt to integrate insights from 
research concerning retrospective long-term memory with research on the 
representation of intentions in memory. We will specify how these processes may be 
related and develop a new line of research based on this integration. Finally, we will 
present an overview of the empirical chapters that detail how we tested our theorizing. 
 
Attention to intentions 
 
Keeping in mind what to do is a core prerequisite for successful functioning in 
everyday life. On a daily basis we may form intentions to do grocery shopping, call an 
old friend, visit a party, or pick up our child at the daycare center. Without the ability 
to maintain such intentions in memory, human behavior would be at the mercy of 
external cues present in the immediate environment, and as such no more than 
inflexible stereotyped reactions elicited by just the right stimulus. An important 
function of memory is to release human behavior from this restricted reliance on 
bottom-up steering of behavior through environmental cues, by providing the 
opportunity to form intentions that can be internally represented and executed later 
(Miller & Cohen, 2001; see also Glenberg, 1997). This top-down guidance of 
behavior ads a great deal of flexibility and complexity to the range of goals we can 
strive for and attain. 
Even though the ability to represent intentions in memory seems to lie at the 
heart of complex human functioning, attention to the nature of these representations 
has remained relatively scarce until recently (see Brandimonte, Einstein & McDaniel, 
1996). In the last two decades or so, however, scientific inquiry concerning 
intentional content in memory has begun to flourish (Förster, Liberman, & Higgens, 
2005; Gollwitzer, 1996; Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; Einstein et al., 2005; Kuhl, 1987, 
2005; Marsh Hicks & Bink, 1998; Lau, Rogers, Haggard, & Passingham, 2005; Shah, 
Friedman & Kruglanski, 2003). The present dissertation aims to provide further 
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insight about this topic by examining a cognitive self-regulatory process that 
contributes to the successful maintenance of intentions in memory. Before discussing 
this possible process we will first define the concept intention and its representation in 
memory.   
 
What is an intention? 
 
In the present dissertation we use the term intention to denote that an individual is 
committed to performing a specific activity in the (near) future (Goschke & Kuhl, 
1993; Kuhl, 1987; Tomassello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). This definition 
entails two central properties of intentions that are elemental for successful intention 
execution: memory for intent and memory for content (Goschke & Kuhl; 
Kvavilashvili, 1987; Lewin, 1926 / 1999). Memory for intent refers to the 
motivational component of an intention. In order to be able to successfully act upon a 
postponed intention it is in the first place necessary that one remembers that one has 
to do something. This component of an intention is free of content (i.e. it does not 
contain the specific activity to be performed), but directs activation to this content. In 
addition to memory for intent it is important to remember what to do (i.e. the content). 
This property of intentions refers to a representation in long-term memory concerning 
the specific activity that needs to be performed in order to complete the intention.  
According to Kuhl (1987), intent and content of intentions, albeit represented 
in separate systems, interact to ensure intention completion. Specifically, the process 
of forming an intention starts with the activation of semantic content in memory1 (e.g. 
go to the beach). If this content involves a commitment of the actor to act upon this 
activation, a motivational maintenance system (MMS) is activated. This MMS is free 
of content, but, when activated, directs activation to any structure that is currently 
most accessible in episodic / semantic memory. MMS ensures that an activated 
representation remains active over time and is protected against competing memory 
representations (Kuhl, 1987). Thus, the content of an intention is special compared 
with other memory representations, because it is in a higher state of activation. This 
idea, i.e. that intention related information is in a higher state of activation than other 
memory representations, can also be found in other memory models and theorizing. 
For instance, in J. R. Anderson’s (1983) adaptive control of thought (ACT*) model 
the concept goal structures refers to intentional information in working memory that 
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is in a constant heightened state of activation. In addition, Lewin (1926 / 1999) 
proposes a force or goal tension in order to explain how intending can lead to action 
especially when the action does not immediately follow intention formation. This goal 
tension signals the individual that there is something to be done.  
 
Intentions in Memory 
 
Memory for intent versus memory for content 
Although the interaction between intent and content constitutes an intention, research 
concerning the representation of intentions in memory has studied these two 
components mainly independent from each other. Particularly, some researchers have 
focused on intent by asking participants to form a very simple intention (press a key 
whenever you see a specific word) and subsequently examine which factors influence 
intention execution (i.e. whether the participant remembers to press the key). Others 
have focused on content by examining retrospective memory for intentional content 
without emphasis on intention execution. Both areas provide valuable insight on the 
nature of intentions. 
First of all, research on event-based or time-based prospective memory has 
primarily focused on factors that influence remembering to execute a specific action 
when the appropriate opportunity arises (i.e. event-based prospective memory; e.g. 
Marsh, Hicks, & Watson, 2002) or within a period of time (i.e. time-based prospective 
memory; e.g. Einstein, McDaniel, Smith, & Shaw, 1998). In event-based prospective 
memory tasks, for instance, participants are asked to perform a background task (e.g. 
lexical decision task) and in addition asked to press a designated key whenever a 
particular stimulus (i.e. the prospective cue) is presented (Marsh, Hicks, Cook, 
Hansen, & Pallos, 2003; Smith, 2003). Research concerned with prospective memory 
has yielded a variety of variables that influence detection of prospective cues 
including degree of concreteness of the cues, cue familiarity, cue distinctiveness and 
demands of the background task (McDaniel & Einstein, 1993; Einstein et al., 1995; 
Einstein, Smith, McDaniel & Shaw, 1997). This research area is primarily, but not 
exclusively, concerned with the study of intent, because the major dependent 
variables consist of frequency or punctuality with which participants execute simple 
activities (for a similar argument see Goschke & Kuhl, 1993). Furthermore, because 
the content of the intention constitutes often no more than one simple word (e.g. press 
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a key whenever the word rake is encountered in Einstein & McDaniel, 1990, 
Experiment 1) the question of whether the content of the intention can be remembered 
is not really an issue. 
In addition to intent, researchers have been concerned with the question of the 
representation of intentional information in long-term memory (i.e. content), 
independently from the question whether or not intentions are successfully executed. 
In this research domain the dependent variables include recall tasks, recognition tasks 
and lexical decision tasks with content of intentions as stimuli in order to study where 
and how content of intentions are represented. The main focus of this dissertation is 
not primarily on whether participants remember to execute a particular behavior 
(although this aspect is examined also), but first and foremost on this latter research 
area: The representation of content of intentions in long-term memory. We will first 
review research that pertains to this topic and subsequently raise new avenues for 
research addressed in this dissertation. 
 
Representation of content of intentions in long-term memory 
 
As outlined above, the content of intentions is special in that it is characterized 
by a heightened state of activation in memory compared to other memory 
representations (Kuhl, 1987). This special status of semantic content concerning an 
intention in long-term memory is supported by empirical evidence from several 
domains in psychology. First of all, recent research by Bargh, Gollwitzer, Chai, 
Barndollar and Troetschel, (2001) has shown that a goal like to perform well remains 
active in memory over time, whereas activation of mere perceptual (non-motivational) 
representations decays over time. However, because their dependent variable to 
measure goal activation (a word search task) is different from their dependent variable 
to measure knowledge activation (an impression formation task) and both dependent 
variables do not tap memory representations directly, their results are difficult to 
interpret. In order to determine whether the content of intentional information stays in 
a higher state of activation it is necessary to tap such representations directly and 
compare them with neutral memory representations using the same dependent 
variable. 
Research concerning the Zeigarnik-effect implemented such a procedure. 
Particularly, based on the theorizing of Lewin (1926 / 1999) described earlier, 
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Zeigarnik (1927) has shown that memory for tasks in which participants were 
interrupted before completion was better than memory for completed tasks. This 
superior recall of task relevant information regarding uncompleted tasks can be 
interpreted as heightened activation directed to information that concerns an 
uncompleted intention (for a review see Butterfield, 1964). Note that in this case the 
focus of examination is on memory for the content of intentional information instead 
of intention execution. Mäntylä and Sgaramella (1996) have replicated this Zeigarnik-
effect and furthermore shown that interruption of completing an intention also 
enhances the detection of intentional content in a subsequent unrelated task. 
The most direct evidence, however, for a special status of intention relevant 
content in memory stems from research by Goschke and Kuhl (1993). In their 
research, Goschke and Kuhl asked participants to memorize two scripts by heart (e.g. 
descriptions of actions related to setting a table and clearing a desk). Next, 
participants were informed that memory for both scripts would be tested in a 
recognition task, but that they would be asked to execute one script as well. This 
manipulation creates two kinds of stimuli: Intention relevant stimuli (from the to be 
executed script) and control stimuli (from the to be remembered script). After 
informing participants which script was to be executed, they first received a 
recognition task that included words from both the to be executed script and the to be 
remembered script.  
Results showed that recognition latencies for the to be executed script were 
faster compared with recognition latencies for the to be remembered script. In a 
(within subjects) control condition, in which participants were asked to observe the 
experimenter execute a script, no reliable difference between the to be observed script 
and the to be remembered script was found. Based on this pattern of results, Goschke 
and Kuhl concluded that content related to an uncompleted or postponed intention is 
in a heightened state of activation compared with memory representations that require 
no execution. In additional experiments, Goschke and Kuhl ruled out selective 
rehearsal of the to be executed script as an alternative explanation for this 
interpretation. For instance, in one experiment they ensured that selective rehearsal 
was blocked by imposing mental load and in another experiment they asked 
participants to imagine execution of both the to be remembered and to be executed 
script before the recognition task. Since the work of Goschke and Kuhl (1993) others 
have replicated the enhanced state of activation of intentional content using lexical 
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decision (Marsh, Hicks, & Bink, 1998) or stroop tasks (Cohen, Dixon, Lindsay, 2005) 
as measures of activation. 
 This enhanced state of activation of intentional content compared with neutral 
memory representations is called the intention-superiority effect (Goschke & Kuhl, 
1993). Enhanced activation is important because without enhanced activation the 
content of an intention could be easily forgotten or be subject to interference from 
other competing plans. This idea, i.e. that uncompleted intentions receive additional 
activation to ensure completion of a postponed intention, is in line with the theorizing 
by Lewin (1926 / 1999) and Kuhl (1987) outlined above. However, it is important to 
note that this enhanced activation concerns a relative comparison between content of 
an intention on the one hand and memory for completed tasks (in the Zeigarnik effect) 
or alternative to be remembered scripts (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; Marsh, Hicks, & 
Bink, 1998) on the other. This issue is acknowledged by Goschke and Kuhl who state 
that it is unclear in their research whether the to be executed script is in a heightened 
state of activation or the to be remembered script is a lowered (i.e. inhibited) state of 
activation or both. Note that both facilitating and inhibitory mechanisms can ensure 
that the content of intentions is shielded from interference in long term-memory. 
 
Fending of distracting stimuli2 
 
Shielding intentions from distraction 
In this dissertation we will argue that inhibitory processes play a major role in the 
shielding of intentions from distracting stimuli. This hypothesis is based on both 
theoretical arguments and empirical evidence concerning the selection of information 
in memory. First of all, although intention superiority may account for shielding a 
specific intention from irrelevant information (i.e. by keeping the intention activated) 
it does not address what happens when distracting stimuli are present. As outlined 
above, the MMS does not discriminate on the basis of content, but sends activation to 
any content that is most accessible in other memory systems. This would become 
problematic in an environment where many current goal-irrelevant, but nevertheless 
attention-grabbing stimuli are near. Once attention is directed towards an interesting 
stimulus (and therefore receives activation in content specific memory systems) the 
current intention could be deprived of activation from the MMS and as a result be 
forgotten. It seems that in situations in which potentially interfering (i.e. distracting) 
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stimuli are present, additional regulatory processes are required to shield intentions 
from oblivion.  
Because the MMS sends activation on the basis of content accessibility and 
not content itself, the presumed additional regulation is most likely controlled by 
content-specific memory systems. These systems can determine whether certain 
specific attention-grabbing stimuli might potentially interfere with the content of an 
intention, and as a result fend off these distractions. Nevertheless, the question 
remains how content-specific mechanisms resolve which information should be 
fended off. It would be quite detrimental for human functioning when, once an 
intention is formed, just any other information is warded off. This would mean that 
we would become preoccupied with the intention without the ability to further react 
flexibly to our environment (see Norman & Shallice, 1986). From a functional 
perspective it seems to be advantageous to avert information only when it might 
interfere with the representation of intentions in memory.  
 
Distracting stimuli and inhibitory processes in long-term memory 
 In order to find out how distracting stimuli and inhibitory processes interact, 
we will first briefly summarize research concerning this topic in the domain of 
retrieval of information in long-term memory. Then we will relate this knowledge to 
the maintenance of intentions in long-term memory. 
 The idea that stimuli that might interfere with the retrieval of a target 
representation in long-term memory can lead to reduced accessibility of these 
distracting stimuli has been examined extensively for some decades (e.g. Anderson, 
Bjork, & Bjork, 1994; Bjork, 1989; Blaxton & Neely, 1983; Carr & Dagenbach, 
1990). For instance, in an experiment by Blaxton and Neely (1983) participants were 
first asked to read (e.g. FRUIT – ORANGE) or generate (through word stem 
completion; e.g. FRUIT – O…..) exemplars from a specific category. Next 
participants were asked to retrieve a new exemplar from the primed category (e.g. 
FRUIT – A). Results showed that participants were slower to come up with a new 
exemplar when they had previously generated, as compared to merely reading, four 
exemplars of the target category (i.e. fruit). These results suggest that repeated 
retrieval of specific information from long-term memory impairs retrieval of related 
(distracting) memory representations. However, on the basis of these findings alone it 
is not entirely clear whether inhibitory processes are responsible for this impairment. 
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Specifically, other non-inhibitory explanations such as output interference (i.e. 
previously retrieved exemplars block access to other exemplars of the category) can 
be applied to this effect so that the postulation of inhibitory processes becomes 
superfluous. 
 Recently Michael Anderson and colleagues (Anderson et al., 1994; Anderson 
& Spellman, 1995) developed a related paradigm to examine inhibitory processes in 
the selection of information in memory. In their so-called retrieval-induced forgetting 
paradigm participants are presented with four phases (Anderson et al., 1994). In the 
first phase of the experiment, the study phase, participants are asked to memorize 
category-exemplar pairs of at least two categories (e.g., fruit-banana, fruit-apple and 
sport-soccer, sport-tennis). In the second phase participants are presented with some 
of the category-exemplar pairs of the study phase, but this time only word stems of 
the exemplars are presented (e.g., fruit-ba). The participants' task is simply to 
complete those word stems. In this retrieval-practice phase each category-word stem 
pair is presented three times. The retrieval-practice phase is followed by a filler task 
that usually lasts between 5 to 20 minutes. Finally, participants are presented with the 
categories and are requested to recall as many exemplars from the study phase as 
possible. 
In analyzing the recall data in research of this kind three types of items can be 
distinguished. First, practiced exemplars from the retrieval practice phase are referred 
to as RP+ items (e.g., banana). These items are generally remembered best. Second 
unpracticed exemplars from practiced categories are referred to as RP- items (e.g., 
apple). Finally, unpracticed exemplars from unpracticed categories are referred to as 
NRP items (e.g., soccer and tennis). The critical comparison in research of this kind is 
the comparison between the recall of RP- items versus the recall of NRP items. An 
emerging literature on retrieval induced forgetting has revealed that recall of RP- 
items is inferior to recall of NRP items. The explanation for this effect is that 
retrieving RP+ items in the retrieval-practice phase inhibits competing exemplars 
from the same category (RP- items), thereby facilitating the search for the RP+ items. 
This inhibition of RP- items prevents the RP- items from being retrieved in the cued-
recall phase. Because no such inhibition is supposed to occur for the NRP items, 
recall of RP- items is worse than recall of NRP items. 
Because with this paradigm non-inhibitory explanations such as output 
interference still hold (see Anderson & Bjork, 1994), Anderson and Spellman (1995) 
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conducted a number of additional experiments that showed that the impaired recall of 
RP- items is category independent. They adopted the same paradigm as previously 
described, but used categories that had overlapping sub-categories (e.g., red-fire, red-
cherry and food-bread, food-tomato). They showed that retrieval of red-cherry 
impaired recall for both red-fire and food-tomato, but not for food-bread. Note that 
recall of tomato was impaired even though this item was studied and cued in the recall 
phase under a different category. This result was explained by assuming that the 
retrieval of a red exemplar (e.g., cherry) caused inhibition of all competing red 
exemplars (e.g., fire and tomato). This category-independence excluded output 
interference as an explanation and Anderson and Spellman concluded that retrieval-
induced forgetting is an inhibitory process (see also Saunders & Macleod, 2006). 
Whether this evidence is sufficient to do so will be discussed later. 
In summary, the research on retrieval-induced forgetting discussed above 
suggests that stimuli interfering with the retrieval of a specific memory representation 
in long-term memory are subsequently inhibited. Possibly this inhibition of 
(temporarily) irrelevant information aids the search for the to be retrieved memory 
representation. 
 
Maintaining intentions in memory 
 
In the present dissertation we intend to apply the knowledge concerning inhibitory 
processes in retrieval of information from long-term memory to the maintenance of 
intentions in memory. We think that this could be a valuable approach in learning 
more about the process underlying the successful maintenance of intentions in 
memory, as both the successful retrieval of information from long-term memory and 
the maintenance of intentions in long-term memory depend on fending off distracting 
information in long-term memory. Of course, retrieval of a target memory 
representation is not exactly the same thing as maintaining an intention in memory. 
Nevertheless, we think that both instances are facilitated by the same kind of 
inhibitory process. To make this reasoning comprehensible we will illustrate it with 
the following examples. 
Imagine that you just taught a class for the first time, and learned the names of 
ten participants. During the lecture five participants request a specific paper. When, 
after class, you go to your office, you see the previously requested paper and you 
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remember that some participants asked for it. Then, you try to retrieve the names of 
the five specific participants that requested the paper. Based on research concerning 
retrieval-induced forgetting it is likely that, in the search for the target names, the five 
non-retrieved names are temporarily inhibited in order to reduce interference of 
irrelevant information and facilitate the selection of the target names. Then again, 
although inhibitory processes aimed at interfering information may aid the search of 
the target names in memory, retrieval of the correct names is in this case fully 
dependent on accurate retrospective memory.  
Now consider the same situation with a slight modification. Imagine that you 
just taught a class for the first time, learned the names of ten participants, and five 
participants ask you for a paper during the lecture. Importantly, immediately 
following this request, you form a commitment to e-mail them this paper once you get 
to your office. This intention will then be stored in memory and receives a special 
status (Kuhl, 1987). To ensure that this intention will be completed successfully, it is 
imperative to keep the names of these five participants accurately in memory. 
However, because you just learned ten new names it can be rather difficult not to get 
confused about whom to e-mail. We argue that in this case inhibitory processes will 
target distracting stimuli (e.g. the irrelevant names) to ensure successful maintenance 
of the precise intentional content over time. Note that in this case inhibition of 
distracting names is supposed to take place upon intention formation and before you 
get to your office. This way completion of the intention is less dependent on 
retrospective memory processes such as retrieval-induced forgetting. 
These examples illustrate the similarity and difference between retrieval-
induced forgetting and inhibition as a result of intention formation. They both rely on 
the idea that selecting target stimuli among distracting (i.e. potentially interfering) 
stimuli causes inhibition of the distracting stimuli. A crucial difference between the 
two processes is that in retrieval-induced forgetting the inhibition is a result of a 
guided search in long-term memory, whereas inhibition of information that may 
interfere with an active intention occurs spontaneously after intention formation. This 
idea, i.e. that after intention formation distracting stimuli are spontaneously inhibited, 
is the core proposition of this dissertation. 
 
Overview of the Current Dissertation 
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In this dissertation we examine whether the selection of target information among 
distracting information leads to inhibition of distracting information. The emphasis is 
on the idea that intention formation will induce inhibition of distracting stimuli. 
However, before beginning this examination we start out with two experiments 
concerning retrieval-induced forgetting. The rationale behind this is twofold. First of 
all, because the present theorizing is based on research concerning retrieval-induced 
forgetting, we deem it important to show that retrieval-induced forgetting indeed 
involves an inhibitory process. Secondly, because the paradigms we develop to show 
that intention formation induces inhibition of distracting stimuli are closely modeled 
after those used in retrieval-induced forgetting, we want to ensure that the materials 
we use are suitable for initiating inhibitory processes. After exploring these issues we 
will focus on examining inhibition of distracting stimuli after intention formation. As 
such, this dissertation can be divided in two parts. 
 In Part 1, which consists of one empirical chapter (Chapter 2), we will 
describe two experiments that were designed to show that retrieval-induced forgetting 
involves an inhibitory process. In particular, we aim to show that retrieval of 
information in long-term memory does not only lead to forgetting of related 
information, but that it can also cause a reduced level of activation of related 
information. Such a result would be an unambiguous indication that retrieval-induced 
forgetting involves an inhibitory process. 
 In Part 2, which consists of 3 empirical chapters (Chapters 3 – 5), we explore 
whether merely forming an intention is a sufficient condition for inhibition of 
distracting information to occur. Furthermore, we examine the nature of this 
inhibition and two moderators of inhibition through intention formation. 
 Finally, in Chapter 6, we will discuss the experiments and draw conclusions. 
Specifically, we will discuss relations among the experiments in a detailed manner, 
raise some limitations and provide avenues for future research. 
 We will now present a brief overview of the empirical chapters. Note that 
because the present dissertation is composed of articles that have been submitted to 
scientific journals the empirical chapters can be read independently from the rest of 
the dissertation. At the same time, this means that parts of the introductions of the 
empirical papers may overlap.  
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Part 1: Inhibitory processes in memory retrieval 
 
Remembering can cause inhibition 
In chapter 2, we intend to show that retrieval-induced forgetting indeed involves an 
inhibitory process. To date, the bulk of research on retrieval-induced forgetting has 
used recall as a dependent measure to assess whether retrieval of a specific memory 
representation causes inhibition of related memory representations. Experiments that 
employed other dependent measures such as perceptual identification or word stem 
completion have mostly failed to obtain any inhibition of related (i.e. distracting) 
stimuli (e.g. Butler, Williams, Zacks, & Maki, 2001; Perfect et al., 2004), which has 
led some to conclude that retrieval-induced forgetting does not involve an inhibitory 
process (e.g. Williams & Zacks, 2001). In Chapter 2 we explain why some of these 
experiments failed to show inhibition of distracting stimuli, and argue that in order to 
assess whether inhibitory processes cause forgetting in retrieval-induced forgetting 
dependent measures should be employed that tap accessibility directly instead of 
measures that tap forgetting. The most suitable measures to do so are speeded 
recognition and lexical decision. In Experiment 2.1 we test whether inhibition of 
distracting stimuli can be obtained on a recognition task and in Experiment 2.2 we test 
whether inhibition of distracting stimuli can be obtained on a lexical decision task. In 
both experiments we expect to obtain evidence for the involvement of inhibitory 
processes in retrieval-induced forgetting. 
 
Part 2: Inhibitory process in goal-directed behavior 
 
Intention-induced inhibition of distracting stimuli 
In Chapter 3 we modify a retrieval-induced forgetting paradigm to test the hypothesis 
that forming an intention can cause inhibition of distracting stimuli. Participants are 
first asked to memorize some words. Next, they are asked to form an intention to 
press the space bar whenever they encounter a subset of three (Experiment 3.1) or five 
(Experiment 3.2) specific exemplars, taken from the first phase, during a lexical 
decision task. In this intention execution task, we also measure accessibility of (a) the 
content of the intention (i.e. the three or five exemplars to which an intention was 
formed), (b) exemplars that were semantically related to content of the intention (i.e. 
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distracting stimuli) and (c) control exemplars by means of lexical decisions. We 
expect that accessibility of the distracting stimuli will be lower than accessibility of 
both intention and control exemplars. We also explore whether this inhibition of 
distracting stimuli is functional in facilitating intention execution. 
 
The nature of inhibition of distracting stimuli 
In Chapter 4 we address two questions that arise from Chapter 3. First of all, we 
investigate whether inhibition of distracting stimuli is found when the measurement of 
the accessibility of the distracting information takes place before the intention needs 
to be executed. On the basis of our theorizing outlined previously, we expect that we 
will obtain inhibition of distracting stimuli immediately after intention formation, and 
before the intention execution phase.  
In addition, we investigate the nature of the inhibition of distracting stimuli 
after the formation of an intention. More specifically, we compared accessibility of 
distracting stimuli in episodic memory with accessibility in semantic memory. 
Because intentions are represented in episodic memory, as they deal with a particular 
place and time (i.e. one has to do something at a particular time when a specific 
opportunity arises), we think it is likely that stimuli that may interfere with such an 
intention are inhibited in episodic memory rather than semantic memory. In other 
words, it is more important to inhibit a distracting stimulus as a potential behavioral 
option than as a semantic concept. To test this idea we compared accessibility of 
distracting stimuli in a recognition task (tapping episodic memory) with accessibility 
in a lexical decision task (tapping semantic memory). We hypothesize that inhibition 
will be obtained in a recognition task, but not in a lexical decision task. 
 
Moderators of inhibition of distracting stimuli 
In Chapter 5 we will examine two possible moderators of the inhibition of distracting 
stimuli in the context of goal-directed behavior. In Experiment 5.1 we intend to 
examine whether depletion of cognitive resources leads to an inability to inhibit 
distracting information. We hypothesize that it will, because inhibitory processes are 
reliant on cognitive resources. In Experiment 5.2 we investigate whether inhibition of 
distracting stimuli is released once an intention is completed. Through these 
moderators we aim to provide convincing evidence that (a) an inhibitory process is at 
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work (Experiment 5.1) and (b) inhibition of distracting stimuli is functional in 
facilitating goal-directed behavior (Experiment 5.2). 
 
Endnotes 
 
1. Apart from semantic memory Kuhl (1987) actually describes two other content 
specific memory systems: emotional memory and action memory. However, because 
these systems are not relevant for the present dissertation they are not discussed. 
2. Throughout this dissertation we will use the terms distracting stimuli, potentially 
interfering stimuli and interfering stimuli interchangeably. In all experiments these 
stimuli are operationalized as stimuli that are semantically related to intention stimuli, 
but are not part of the intention stimuli. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Remembering Can Cause Inhibition: 
Retrieval-Induced Inhibition as Cue-Independent Process* 
 
 
Remembering is a pervasive aspect of everyday life. Locating one's locker after a day 
in the swimming pool, doing grocery shopping for the weekend, or remembering the 
telephone number of an old friend all depend on our ability to retrieve specific 
information from memory. Paradoxically, recent research has shown that the act of 
remembering may cause forgetting (Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994). More 
specifically, retrieving information from a particular category (e.g., retrieving the 
phone number of an old friend) can induce forgetting of related information within 
that category (e.g., the phone number of a family member), compared with 
information about an independent category (e.g., one's groceries). This effect has been 
termed retrieval-induced forgetting (Anderson et al., 1994). Two experiments are 
reported that examine whether this forgetting (a) involves an inhibitory process and 
(b) is cue independent. 
In the retrieval-induced forgetting paradigm, participants memorize category-
exemplar pairs. After this study phase, participants perform retrieval practice on half 
of the exemplars of some of the studied categories. This procedure creates three types 
of exemplars: practiced exemplars (RP+ items), unpracticed exemplars from the 
practiced categories (RP- items), and unpracticed exemplars from the unpracticed 
categories (NRP items). After the retrieval practice, participants receive the categories 
as cues and are requested to recall as many exemplars as possible. An emerging 
literature on retrieval-induced forgetting has revealed that recall of RP- items is 
inferior to recall of NRP items. The explanation for this effect is that retrieving RP+ 
items in the retrieval practice phase inhibits access to competing exemplars from the 
                                                 
*
 This chapter is based on Veling, H. & van Knippenberg A. (2004). Remembering 
can cause inhibition: Retrieval-induced inhibition as cue independent process. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. 
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same category (RP- items), thereby facilitating the search for the RP+ items. This 
inhibition of RP- items prevents these items from being retrieved in the cued-recall 
phase. 
To exclude some noninhibitory explanations for this effect (see Anderson & 
Bjork, 1994), Anderson and Spellman (1995) adopted the same paradigm as 
previously described but used categories that had overlapping subcategories. They 
showed that retrieval practice of particular exemplars impaired recall of all competing 
exemplars even when these exemplars were cued in the recall phase under a different 
category. This cue independence excluded some noninhibitory accounts of retrieval-
induced forgetting, and Anderson and Spellman concluded that retrieval-induced 
forgetting was an inhibitory process. 
However, as Perfect, Moulin, Conway, and Perry (2002) have noted, recall 
may not be the most suitable measure to assess whether retrieval-induced forgetting is 
an inhibitory process. The most unambiguous definition of inhibition would describe 
it as a reduction in the level of activation of a memory representation (Perfect et al., 
2002). On the basis of this definition, one cannot directly demonstrate inhibition by 
means of recall data. For instance, it is conceivable that the impaired recall of RP- 
items results from a specific retrieval process, independent of a possible reduction of 
the activation level of RP- items.1 
One way to measure inhibition directly may be achieved by using a reaction 
time paradigm in which participants are instructed to react as quickly as possible to 
the presented items. Presenting participants with the items themselves would preempt 
the active retrieval process, and the resulting response latencies would be more 
directly indicative of the activation level of the items. To our knowledge, there is only 
one published experiment that adopted such a procedure. In this experiment (Perfect 
et al., 2002; Experiment 5), participants verified as quickly as possible whether 
certain category-exemplar pairs were originally presented in the study phase. Their 
results showed that participants were reliably slower in reacting to RP- items than in 
reacting to either RP+ or NRP items (Perfect et al., 2002). However, the inclusion of 
the category in the recognition phase constitutes a problem here. It is conceivable that 
the presentation of a category automatically triggers the activation of RP+ items, 
because RP+ items were repeatedly activated in connection with their category during 
the retrieval practice phase. It is possible that whenever a category cue and RP- item 
are presented simultaneously, RP+ items are spontaneously activated and block RP- 
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items from immediate recognition. A truly inhibitory account of retrieval-induced 
forgetting should be based on measures that tap inhibited access as directly as 
possible and without any category cues present. This is what we aimed to do in the 
experiments reported below. 
 
Experiment 2.1 
 
The aim of our first experiment was twofold. First, we aimed to replicate the findings 
of Perfect et al. (2002) by showing that retrieval-induced forgetting can be obtained 
using recognition latencies. Second, we aimed to extend the findings of Perfect et al. 
by not using the categories as cues in the recognition phase. This would exclude the 
alternative explanation for the Perfect et al. Experiment 5 results described above. We 
expected that participants would be slower to react to the RP- items than to either the 
RP+ or NRP items. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Fifty-four undergraduate students at the University of Nijmegen participated in 
Experiment 2.1 in exchange for € 1 (approximately $1.15). 
 
Stimuli 
Three categories (fruits, sports, and animals), each comprising six exemplars, were 
constructed for Experiment 2.1. These category-exemplar pairs were selected from a 
recent study on category norms in which Dutch category-exemplar pairs were 
generated (Storms, 2001).2 The exemplars were selected from this sample so that the 
two most frequently occurring exemplars per category were excluded from the 
stimulus set. Furthermore each exemplar had a unique two-letter word stem. The 
fillers for the recognition task were selected in such a way that they could not be 
interpreted as belonging to one of the experimental categories. 
 
 
Procedure 
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Participants were tested in individual cubicles. They read at their own pace through 
the instructions presented on a computer screen. In the first phase, participants were 
asked to study word pairs that belonged to one of three categories: fruits, sports, or 
animals. They were informed that they would have to retrieve those word pairs later 
in the experiment. The category-exemplar pairs were presented for 5 s in a rectangle 
that was displayed in the center of the computer screen. The categories were presented 
in capitals and were separated by a dash from the exemplars, which were presented in 
lowercase letters (e.g., FRUIT-strawberry). Between presentations, there was a 1-s 
interval. The category-exemplar pairs of each category were presented as a block. The 
order in which these blocks were presented, and the presentation of the exemplars 
within each block were randomized. Before each block, participants were informed 
about the category to be presented. 
Immediately after the study phase, participants were informed that they would 
receive category cues followed by the first two letters of corresponding exemplars 
from the study phase. The categories were presented in capitals and were separated by 
a dash from the word stems, which were presented in lowercase letters (e.g., FRUIT-
st—). Category-word stem combinations were displayed one at a time. The 
participants' task was simply to complete the word stems by typing in the 
corresponding exemplars below the category-word stem combinations. In this 
retrieval practice phase, each participant was presented with six different category-
word stem combinations, which were presented three times in three blocks of six 
trials. Within each block, every combination was presented once in a random order. 
Participants always practiced six exemplars, three exemplars of two different 
categories. This way, the number of RP+, RP-, and NRP items was always six. To 
ensure that every exemplar would function as an RP+, RP-, and NRP item, six sets 
were constructed counterbalancing exemplars across item types. 
After the retrieval practice phase, participants were informed that words would 
be presented in the middle of the computer screen. These words would be either new 
or taken from the study phase. The presentation of the words on the screen was 
preceded by an asterisk. After a random interval of between 1.5 and 2 s, the asterisk 
was replaced by a word, and participants had to indicate as quickly and accurately as 
possible whether this word had been presented in the study phase. They could do so 
by pressing the left button (the a) when a new word was presented and the right button 
(the 6) when a word from the study phase was presented, on a QWERTY keyboard. 
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The stimulus words disappeared from the screen immediately after the participant's 
response. The intertrial interval was 1 s. 
The recognition task included 36 trials, 18 new words and the 18 exemplars 
from the study phase. Two orders of stimulus presentation (new words, studied 
words) were constructed to prevent the same response from occurring more than two 
times in a row. Within these two orders, the stimuli were randomly selected. One of 
these orders was randomly selected between participants. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
An average recall rate of 99.1% in the retrieval practice phase indicated that the 
participants were very successful in retrieving the exemplars. 
The analyses of both Experiments 1 and 2 were computed on the participants' 
median reaction latencies with the exclusion of error trials.3 First, we performed a 
single-factor (item type: RP+, RP-, or NRP) within-subjects analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) to assess whether retrieval-induced forgetting on recognition times had 
occurred. The main effect of item type was reliable, F(2, 106) = 22.13, p < .05. 
Simple effects tests revealed that participants were reliably quicker at indicating that 
RP+ items had been presented (M = 678 ms, SEM = 112) than indicating that NRP 
items had been presented (M = 759 ms, SEM = 118), F(1, 53) = 15.76, p < .05. More 
important, however, RP- items had reliably longer recognition latencies (M = 810 ms, 
SEM = 158) than did NRP items, F(1, 53) = 5.02, p < .05. Finally, participants had 
longer reaction latencies on RP- items than on RP+ items, F(1, 53) = 65.66, p < .05. 
We replicated the retrieval-induced forgetting effect in this experiment using a 
recognition test: Participants were slower in recognizing RP- items relative to 
recognizing NRP items. In addition, it was shown that this effect was obtained 
without presenting the categories as cues in the recognition phase, thus supporting a 
cue independent account of retrieval-induced forgetting. 
However, there may still be one alternative interpretation. Theoretically it 
could well be that participants, when verifying whether they had seen a particular 
exemplar, retrieved the category to facilitate their response. The fact that we selected 
filler items that did not belong to the experimental categories might even have 
fostered the use of the categories as peripheral cues in the recognition process. 
Because the categories are strongly linked to the RP+ items in the retrieval practice 
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phase, it could be that exposure to RP- items also activated RP+ items. This activation 
of RP+ items could have interfered with the recognition of RP- items, resulting in 
slower responses to RP- items. Note that this interpretation would argue against an 
inhibitory explanation. We therefore conducted a second experiment in which 
interference from spontaneous category activation is extremely implausible. 
 
Experiment 2.2 
 
The main goal of Experiment 2.2 was to examine whether retrieval-induced forgetting 
could be found in an implicit test of memory. This would be important for two 
reasons. First, it would rule out the alternative interpretation of the results of 
Experiment 2.1 and show that retrieval-induced forgetting is really cue independent. 
Second, by ruling out competitive RP+ retrieval as a potential causal factor, we would 
have a strong case for arguing that retrieval-induced forgetting is indeed an inhibitory 
process. The first two phases of Experiment 2.2 were similar to Experiment 2.1. The 
third phase in Experiment 2.2, the implicit memory test, was a lexical decision task. 
We expected that participants would be slower to indicate that exemplars of RP- items 
were words than exemplars of either RP+ or NRP items. The lexical decision task 
seemed suitable for our present purpose, because it did not require any activation of 
the categories of the previously studied categories, nor did it involve an active 
retrieval process of the RP+, RP-, and NRP items. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Thirty-nine undergraduate students at the University of Nijmegen participated in 
Experiment 2.2 in exchange for €1. 
 
 
 
Stimuli 
In Experiment 2.2, we used 12 categories, each containing two exemplars. Nine of 
these categories were selected as experimental categories, and 3 of them were selected 
Remembering can cause Inhibition 
 
 31  
as filler categories. These category-exemplar pairs were again selected from the 
sample of Storms (2001). Within each category, exemplars were matched for word 
frequency and word length. In addition, each exemplar had a unique two-letter word 
stem. 
There were two types of fillers used in the lexical decision task. First, there 
were 18 words that did not belong to any of the categories. These were included to 
separate the experimental exemplars by at least three trials. Second, we used 36 
pronounceable letter strings, which were not part of the Dutch vocabulary (i.e., 
nonwords). Word length of those letter strings was matched to the length of the 
experimental exemplar words. 
 
Procedure 
The procedure of the first two phases of Experiment 2.2 was virtually identical to the 
procedure of the first two phases of Experiment 2.1. Only deviations from this 
procedure are mentioned. First, the category names were not presented on the 
instruction screen of the study phase. Second, the experimental category-exemplar 
pairs were presented in two blocks of nine presentations. The allocation of category-
exemplar pairs to the blocks was randomized, with the restriction that each category 
appeared only once within a block. Before, between, and after these two experimental 
blocks, two category-exemplar pairs were presented as fillers to prevent the 
occurrence of primacy and recency effects and to separate the presentation of 
exemplars of the same category by at least three trials. This last measure was taken to 
reduce opportunities for association among exemplars. In the retrieval practice phase, 
participants practiced six exemplars of six different categories. This way, the number 
of RP+, RP-, and NRP items was always six. Six sets were constructed, 
counterbalancing exemplars among item types. 
Following the retrieval practice, participants were presented with a lexical 
decision task. They were instructed to indicate as quickly and as accurately as 
possible whether a letter string, presented in the middle of the computer screen, was a 
word. Participants were instructed to press the left button (the a) when a nonword was 
presented and the right button (the 6) when a word was presented, on a QWERTY 
keyboard. An asterisk that indicated the spot where the letter string would appear 
preceded the presentation of the letter strings. After a random interval of between 1.5 
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and 2 s, a letter string replaced this asterisk. After a participant's response, the letter 
string disappeared from the screen immediately. The intertrial interval was 1.5 s. 
Before the actual test block, a practice block of six filler trials was presented, 
in which three words and three nonwords were presented in a random order. This 
practice block was followed by the lexical decision task, which consisted of 72 trials, 
including 18 exemplars from the first phase, 18 new filler words, and 36 nonwords. 
Two orders of stimulus presentation (exemplars, fillers, and nonwords) were 
constructed on the basis of two criteria. First, the same response (word or nonword) 
was not allowed to occur more than three times in a row. Second, when the same 
response occurred three times in a row, it was never followed by an exemplar from 
the first phase of the experiment. Within these two orders, the stimuli were randomly 
selected. One of these orders was randomly selected between participants. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
An average recall rate of 96.0% in the retrieval practice phase indicated that the 
participants were very successful in retrieving the exemplars. First, we performed a 
single-factor (item type: RP+, RP-, or NRP) within-subjects ANOVA on the 
participants' median reaction times to assess whether retrieval-induced forgetting on 
lexical decision times had occurred. The main effect of item type was reliable, F(2, 
76) = 4.28, p < .05. Simple effects tests revealed that this effect was due to longer 
reaction times to the RP- items (M = 574 ms, SEM = 61) compared with both NRP 
items (M = 542 ms, SEM = 48) and RP+ items (M = 542 ms, SEM = 48), respective 
comparisons F(1, 38) = 6.42, p < .05, and F(1, 38) = 5.90, p < .05. 
The results of Experiment 2.2 show that participants were slower in deciding 
that RP- items are words compared with both RP+ items and NRP items, thereby 
showing retrieval-induced forgetting on an implicit test of memory. Actually, 
forgetting is not an appropriate term to describe the results of Experiment 2.2. Our 
dependent measure, the lexical decision latencies, taps into word accessibility rather 
than explicit retrieval and may therefore be argued to be more directly indicative of 
inhibition effects. A more appropriate label for the effect obtained in Experiment 2.2 
would therefore be retrieval-induced inhibition. 
A second important finding of Experiment 2.2 is that this retrieval-induced 
inhibition is cue independent. We presented the exemplars of the RP+, RP-, and NRP 
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items in the lexical decision task without their categories and obtained slowest 
responses to the RP- items. Theoretically, one could still argue that the participants 
might have spontaneously retrieved the categories when presented with these 
exemplars, but this was highly unlikely for two reasons. First, it is hard to see how 
retrieving categories of exemplars would be helpful in deciding whether a letter string 
is a word. Second, the use of many (nine) experimental categories in Experiment 2.2 
reduces the likelihood of spontaneous category activation. Therefore the results of 
Experiment 2.2 provide strong evidence that retrieval-induced inhibition is indeed cue 
independent. 
Unlike in Experiment 2.1, we did not find a reliable difference between the 
RP+ and NRP items in Experiment 2.2. This seeming inconsistency may be explained 
by comparing the respective dependent variables. As a result of retrieval practice, 
participants may have become more confident (and hence faster) in deciding that they 
did see an RP+ word before, compared with the NRP words in Experiment 2.1. In 
Experiment 2.2, however, the participants' task was simply to indicate whether the 
stimulus was a word. Of course, recent repeated retrieval may enhance accessibility, 
but considering that all study words were shown before at least once, any additional 
enhanced accessibility effect on the basis of repeated exposure (one vs. four times) 
would be of minor magnitude and unlikely to be detected in lexical decisions. 
 
General Discussion 
 
Two experiments provided suggestive evidence that retrieval of exemplars from a 
category leads to a reduction in the activation level of unpracticed exemplars from the 
same category. In addition, we demonstrated retrieval-induced inhibition in tasks in 
which exemplars of the experimental categories are presented without category cues. 
Although this cue independence may be subject to an alternative explanation in 
Experiment 2.1, the results of Experiment 2.2 were more unequivocal: Exemplars are 
inhibited by prior retrieval of related exemplars, even outside the context of their 
shared category membership. As mentioned earlier, this is important because it further 
reduces the plausibility of a noninhibitory account of our data. 
The fact that we observed retrieval-induced inhibition even when participants 
were presented with the exemplars may seem contradictory to earlier research (Butler, 
Williams, Zacks, & Maki, 2001; Perfect et al., 2002) that did not always find 
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retrieval-induced forgetting when participants were presented with item-specific cues 
(but see Anderson et al., 1994). The crucial difference between these earlier studies 
and the present studies is that we used reaction latencies. When (part of) an item is 
presented, a delayed response latency is a more adequate indicator of inhibition than 
failure to retrieve, because inhibition may be gradually released when item-specific 
cues are presented (see also Bjork & Bjork, 1996). 
The experiments reported here are not the first to claim that an inhibitory 
process underlies retrieval-induced forgetting (e.g., Anderson & Spellman, 1995). 
However, previous experiments have relied on recall as a dependent measure to assess 
inhibition. Starting from the definition of inhibition as reduced activation level, we 
aimed to demonstrate inhibition effects in a more direct way. Adding our direct 
evidence to earlier indirect evidence considerably strengthens the case for an 
inhibitory account of retrieval-induced forgetting. 
 
Endnotes 
 
1. For a similar argument, see Bjork and Bjork (1996), who, in the context of directed 
forgetting, distinguished retrieval inhibition from a reduction in the strength of a 
memory representation. 
2. All stimuli can be obtained from Harm Veling. 
3. Using means with a cut-off criterion of either 2 s or 3 s as data instead of medians 
led to similar results compared with the median reaction latencies in both Experiments 
2.1 and 2.2. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Shielding intentions from distraction: Forming an intention 
induces inhibition of distracting stimuli* 
 
 
Fending off distractions to shield execution and completion of intentions is 
indispensable for successful goal pursuit. Preparing a lecture, reading an article or 
writing a paper all depend, at least partly, on the ability not to get distracted too often. 
Unfortunately, however, there are usually many environmental cues that might 
interfere with the processing of intention-related behavior and hence hinder the proper 
implementation of our intentions: Receiving an e-mail at work from a friend may 
trigger a memory representation of a party that temporarily interferes with preparing 
the lecture, reading the article or writing the paper. Nevertheless, in many cases we 
appear to be able to cope with distraction and reach our intended goals. Apparently, 
self-regulatory processes can overcome or shield ongoing intentions from these 
distractions. The present paper is concerned with the question of how we execute 
appropriate behavior in response to suitable environmental cues without interference 
from distracting cues. 
Goal-directed behavior is in large part determined by environmental cues (see 
Bargh, 1990; Bargh & Ferguson, 2000). These cues may guide behavior either 
directly or mediated by internal representations (Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; Gollwitzer 
& Moskowitz, 1996). Indeed, a growing area of research is showing that goal-related 
cues can activate goals, goal-directed information processing and goal-directed 
behavior even without awareness of these cues (e.g. Bargh, Gollwitzer, Chai, 
Barndollar, & Troetschel, 2001; Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, 
Wasel, & Schaal, 1999). For instance, Bargh et al. showed that priming participants 
with an achievement goal increased performance on an intellectual task compared 
                                                 
*
 This chapter is based on: Veling, H., & van Knippenberg, A. (2006a). Shielding 
intentions from distraction: Forming an intention induces inhibition of distracting 
stimuli. Social Cognition. 
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with performance in a control condition. Because environmental cues play such a 
major role in goal-directed behavior, regulation of accessibility of these cues seems 
crucial for successful goal attainment. Once a goal is chosen, it is important to shield 
this goal from interference of distracting stimuli. Presumably then, goal attainment is 
facilitated by inhibition of interfering stimuli such as alternative goals, temptations or 
distracting environmental cues (Kruglanski et al., 2002; Mischel, Cantor & Feldman, 
1996).  
Consistent with this reasoning recent research on goal shielding has shown 
that activation of a focal goal causes inhibition of alternative goals (Shah, Friedman & 
Kruglanski, 2002). More specifically, Shah et al. showed that activation of a self-
relevant goal to which participants are committed causes inhibition of alternative 
goals that could interfere with attainment of the self-relevant goal. Thus, at the level 
of goal representations it is clear that activation of a desired goal causes inhibition of 
interfering goals. However, the process of goal striving does not end with activation 
of a (abstract) focal goal. Successful goal pursuit also relies on self-regulatory skills in 
initiating, executing and completing goals (Gollwitzer, 1999; Mischel, Cantor & 
Feldman, 1996). 
So, after goal selection, planning of goal attainment becomes imperative (e.g. 
Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987; Gollwitzer, 1990, 1996). During this 
implementation phase of goal pursuit more concrete goals are needed that deal with 
fulfillment of the how, where and when of goal pursuit (e.g. Heckhausen & 
Gollwitzer, 1987; Gollwitzer, 1996). We will refer to such concrete goals as 
intentions (see Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne & Henrike, in press). More 
specifically, Kuhl (1987) defines an intention as “…an activated plan to which an 
actor committed herself or himself…” (p. 282). Thus, intentions specify behaviors 
required for goal completion and hence differ from goals in that they are more 
concrete. In addition, as compared to goals, intentions are highly variable, because 
most goals can be achieved in numerous ways. Just as abstract goals, however, 
intentions require shielding from distraction in order to complete them (Gollwitzer, 
1999). How can we accomplish this shielding of intentions? 
On the level of goal representations Shah, Friedman and Kruglanski (2002) 
have argued that inhibition of distracting goals is learned: After repeatedly inhibiting 
a distracting goal in setting of a focal goal, mere activation of the focal goal inhibits 
the distracting goal. Such learning of inhibitory relations is possible, because, at some 
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level of abstraction (e.g. shopping, studying, partying, sporting), at a particular point 
in time, there may not exist so many competing goals.  
However, a similar process seems unlikely for inhibition of distracting cues in 
the case of shielding intentions. As described above, goal implementation through the 
formulation of concrete intentions can be very variable. Additionally, distractions that 
might interfere with an intention are also highly variable. These distractions may 
include other intentions, distracting memory representations, and virtually any 
interesting salient environmental stimulus. Consequently, it seems virtually 
inconceivable that one could learn an inhibitory relation between every intention and 
every distracting stimulus. The scope of possible relations between feasible intentions 
and possible distractions when implementing attainment of a focal goal seems too 
wide and diverse to be ever learned. Postulation of a flexible mechanism that targets 
all kinds of interference seems necessary to explain how intentions are shielded from 
distraction.  
We argue that the degree of interference of a stimulus predicts the level of 
inhibition this interfering stimulus is subjected to. If a stimulus does not interfere with 
an ongoing intention there is no need to inhibit it. However, if a stimulus does 
interfere with an ongoing intention, shielding from this stimulus becomes necessary 
for successful intention completion. A comparable process has already been revealed 
in research on the retrieval of information from long-term memory. In particular, 
research on retrieval-induced forgetting (Anderson, Bjork & Bjork, 1994) has shown 
that retrieval of a specific memory representation from long-term memory can cause 
forgetting (e.g. Anderson, Bjork & Bjork, 1994; Macrae & MacLeod, 1999) and 
inhibition (Anderson & Spellman, 1995; Veling & van Knippenberg, 2004) of related 
memory representations. The explanation for this paradoxical effect is that during 
retrieval of a specific memory representation, other related memory representations 
also become activated. As these related representations may interfere with retrieval of 
the intended memory representation, inhibitory processes suppress the related 
interfering representations, thereby facilitating selection of the target memory 
representation (Anderson & Spellman, 1995; a similar process has also been shown 
on a neurological level in the context of intentional forgetting by Anderson et al. 
2004). 
It may be argued that retrieval is just a special case that recruits executive 
control processes to override pre-potent responses (in this case override retrieval of 
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interfering memories; Anderson, 2003). The inhibitory mechanisms that cause 
inhibition of interfering memory representations are not limited to retrieval processes 
but, as Anderson (2003) stated, "are essential to our ability to behave in a flexible, 
context-appropriate manner" (p. 442). Consistent with this reasoning we argue that 
intentions recruit inhibitory processes to deal with interfering (and thus distracting) 
stimuli. Furthermore, we think that this inhibition of interference can occur 
spontaneously, i.e. once an intention is active interference will be inhibited without an 
instruction to do so. 
To test this idea we asked participants to form an intention and subsequently 
we measured the accessibility of interfering and control cues. In the present research 
we manipulated the degree of interference by varying strength of semantic 
associations between intention relevant cues with other environmental cues. The idea 
is that stronger associates interfere more and therefore require inhibition (see 
Anderson & Spellman, 1995). We presented participants with exemplars from two 
semantic categories (fruits and animals). Next, we asked participants to form an 
intention to respond to a selection of exemplars of one of the categories (e.g. peach, 
melon and strawberry). After that, we measured the accessibility of cues from the 
same semantic category as the intentional cues (e.g. grape, plum and orange; i.e. the 
distracting cues) and cues from an unrelated semantic category (e.g. elephant, rabbit 
and lion; i.e. the control cues) during an intention execution task. Our hypothesis is 
that cues that are semantically related to the intentional cues are more likely to 
interfere with the content of the intention and hence require more inhibition compared 
with cues from an unrelated semantic category. We tested this hypothesis in two 
experiments. 
 
The present paradigm 
 
In both experiments participants first memorized exemplars of two categories (e.g. 
fruit-peach, fruit-grape, animal-lion, animal-elephant). This phase was included to 
activate all stimuli in memory. In the second phase participants received a modified 
lexical decision task. Participants were instructed to do a lexical decision task and in 
addition to form an intention to press the space bar after each lexical decision 
concerning a subset of exemplars from one of the categories. Pressing a designated 
key in response to a specific cue has been used previously to operationalize intentions 
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(e.g. Marsh, Hicks, & Cook, 2005). This manipulation generated three types of cues: 
exemplars that require a space bar response after the lexical decision (intention cues; 
e.g. peach), exemplars from the same semantic category as the intention cues that do 
not require a space bar response (distracting cues; e.g. grape), and exemplars from an 
unrelated category that do not require a space bar response (control cues: e.g. lion). 
Note that the instruction in the first phase to memorize all the exemplars enhanced the 
probability that the distracting cues would require inhibition during this lexical 
decision task. By means of lexical decision latencies to the different cues we assessed 
the accessibility of all memorized exemplars. We hypothesize slower lexical decision 
latencies to distracting cues compared with lexical decision latencies to control cues. 
Moreover, we explored whether this inhibition facilitates the execution of the 
intentions (space bar presses). 
 
Experiment 3.1 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Seventy-three undergraduate students from the Radboud University Nijmegen 
participated in Experiment 3.1 in exchange for €2 (approximately $2.60). 
 
Materials 
Two categories (fruit and animals) each comprising 6 exemplars were constructed for 
Experiment 3.1. These category-exemplar pairs were selected from a study on 
category norms in which Dutch category-exemplar pairs were generated (Storms, 
2001)1. The exemplars of each category were matched for category typicality and 
word length. To ensure that every exemplar would function as an intention cue, 
distracting cue or control cue, four sets were constructed in which the function of 
exemplars varied between participants. Three exemplars of one category served as 
intention cues within each set leaving the other three exemplars from this selected 
category as distracting cues. The exemplars from the other category served as control 
cues. 
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Two types of fillers were used in the lexical decision task. First, 5 words were 
included that did not belong to any of the categories. These words were presented 
within the first 10 trials in order to familiarize the participants with the lexical 
decision task. In addition we used 53 non-words as fillers to ensure that the 
probability of a word response equaled the probability of a non-word response. These 
were 53 pronounceable letter strings, which were not part of the Dutch vocabulary. 
All fillers were matched to the length of the experimental cues. 
 
Procedure 
In the present experiments participants read self-paced through the instructions. The 
first instructions screen informed the participants that the experiment consisted of 
three phases. In the first phase, participants were asked to study word pairs from two 
categories: fruits and animals. Participants were informed that they would be asked to 
retrieve those word pairs in the final phase of the experiment. Category exemplar 
pairs were then presented one by one for 5 s with a 1 s interval between presentations. 
The categories were presented in capitals and were separated by a dash from the 
exemplars, which were presented in lower case letters (e.g., FRUIT - mango). The 
category-exemplar pairs of each category were presented as a block. The order of 
these blocks and the presentation of the exemplars within each block were 
randomized. 
 The second phase of the experiment was presented as a study on memorizing 
intentions. First, participants received instructions for the lexical decision task. They 
were instructed to indicate as fast and as accurately as possible whether letter strings, 
presented in the middle of the computer screen, were words. Participants were 
instructed to press the left button (the F) when a non-word was presented and the right 
button (the K) when a word was presented, on a QWERTY keyboard. An asterisk that 
was presented for 1.5 to 2 s indicated the spot where letter strings would appear. 
Following a participant’s response a backward mask (XXXXXX) replaced the letter 
string. This mask remained on the screen for 1.5 s.  
Subsequently, participants read that they were required to press the space bar 
after lexical decisions concerning three specific words from one of the categories 
presented in the first phase of the experiment. This space bar response could be 
executed during the presentation of the backward mask. The instruction was: After 
your lexical decision concerning peach, melon and mango we need you to press the 
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space bar (the presented intention cues depended on the stimulus set participants 
received). Moreover, to ensure fast and accurate responses, we promised to reward the 
fastest, most accurate participant with a book token of €10. After this instruction 
participants read a summary of all instructions, which emphasized that the occasional 
space bar response should occur after the lexical decision. Furthermore, participants 
read that they should use a thumb of their hand of choice to press the space bar. They 
were asked to keep their index fingers on the F and K buttons and their thumbs on the 
space bar during the reaction time task. After reading these instructions they could 
press a button to start the reaction time task.  
The reaction time task consisted of 106 trials. All intention cues and all 
distracting cues were presented four times each (24 trials in total) and the control cues 
were presented twice (24 trials in total). Thus, the reaction time task consisted of 106 
trials (12 intention cues, 12 distracting cues, 24 control cues, 5 filler words and 53 
filler non-words). Two orders of trial presentation were constructed (control cue, non-
word, intention cue, etc). Within these orders the stimuli were randomly selected and 
one of these orders was randomly selected between participants. 
The reaction time task was followed by a free recall task in which participants 
were cued with the category labels and were asked to write down as many of the 
exemplars from the first phase of the experiment as possible. Note that this free recall 
task was merely inserted as a follow up to the memorize instructions given earlier in 
the experiment. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Two participants were excluded from the following analyses because they pressed the 
space bar on every trial, leaving 71 participants for analyses. In Experiments 3.1 and 
3.2 we used several data transformations to deal with outliers (i.e. a cut-off criterion 
of 2 s, a cut-off-criterion of 3 s or removal of response latencies beyond 3 SDs from 
the mean). The following analyses are reliable in all these transformations. The 
reported analyses and means are based on the 3 s cut-off criterion (retaining 99.7 % of 
the data distribution in both experiments). Furthermore, we excluded trials in which 
lexical decisions were incorrect (2.3%) and trials in which participants made an 
erroneous space bar response (1.8 %). 
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To test whether intentions caused inhibition of distracting cues we performed 
a single factor (cue type: intention, distracting, control) within-subjects analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) on the lexical decision latencies. As expected, the main effect of 
cue type was reliable, F(2, 140) = 4.41, p < .05. Simple effect tests revealed that this 
effect was caused by increased reaction times to the distracting cues (M = 698 ms, SD 
= 178) compared with both the intention cues (M = 672 ms, SD = 165) and control 
cues (M = 668 ms, SD = 113), respective comparisons F(1,70) = 10.53, p < .05, d = 
.15, and F(1,70) = 5.42, p < .05, d = .20. There was no reliable difference between the 
intention and control cues, F(1, 70) < 1, ns. The increased lexical decision latencies to 
the distracting cues demonstrate that cues that interfere with an intention are indeed 
inhibited. As such, these results are consistent with the idea that distracting stimuli are 
inhibited to shield the implementation of intentions.  
Next, we assessed whether this inhibition of distracting cues was helpful in 
executing the space bar response after lexical decisions to intention cues. To examine 
this functionality of the observed inhibition of distraction, we computed a correlation 
between the strength of inhibition (calculated as the difference between lexical 
decision latencies to distracting cues and lexical decision latencies to control cues) 
and goal directed behavior (latencies of space bar presses), partialling out the mean 
lexical decision latencies on all trials (to control for individual differences in reaction 
times). This analysis yielded a reliable negative partial correlation between these two 
variables, pr(68) = -.28, p < .05. This correlation indicates that stronger inhibition of 
distraction is related to faster space bar pressing. Thus, it appears that intentional 
behavior (space bar presses) is facilitated if distracting cues are inhibited more 
strongly. This partial correlation corroborates a functional account of the inhibition of 
distracting cues, by showing that protecting the content of intentions, through 
inhibition of distraction, facilitates execution of these intentions. 
At first sight it may seem remarkable that accessibility of intention cues was 
not facilitated compared with accessibility of control cues. Indeed, studies in the 
domain of implementation intentions, for instance, have reported increased 
accessibility of intention relevant cues (e.g. Aarts, Dijksterhuis, & Midden, 1999; for 
a review see Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2004). However, the pattern of the present results 
is consistent with prior research (Veling & van Knippenberg, 2004, Experiment 2) 
that also reported inhibition of distracting cues, but no facilitation in lexical decision 
latencies of cues with a special status (in that case repeatedly retrieved cues). 
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Presumably, explicitly memorizing cues produces asymptotic levels of accessibility of 
both intention and control cues which leads to ceiling effects concerning these cues in 
the subsequent lexical decision task. As a result, the lexical decision task only reveals 
inhibition of distracting cues. Similarly, forming an intention may not necessarily 
enhance accessibility of intention cues compared with (also presented) control cues. 
Consequently, the absence of facilitation of intention cues in Experiment 3.1 should 
not be interpreted as intention cues having no special status (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 
2004; see also Goschke & Kuhl, 1993), but should be attributed to the nature of the 
dependent measure in combination with memorized words. 
 
Experiment 3.2 
 
In Experiment 3.2 we aimed to replicate the findings of Experiment 3.1. Moreover, 
because in everyday life distractions are unexpected and maybe infrequent, we 
examined whether the inhibition of distracting cues would still hold in a more 
complex situation. To examine this, participants in Experiment 3.2 received 5 
intention cues that were only presented once in a total of 92 trials. So whereas the 
probability of encountering an intention cue in Experiment 3.1 was 11.3%, this 
probability was reduced to 5.4 % in Experiment 3.2. In addition, a specific intention 
cue was presented only once in Experiment 3.2 compared with 4 times in Experiment 
3.1. We expected the same pattern of results as we have observed in Experiment 3.1. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Fifty-five undergraduate students from the Radboud University Nijmegen participated 
in Experiment 3.2 in exchange for €2 (approximately $2.60). 
 
 
Materials 
Two categories (fruit and animals) each comprising 10 exemplars were constructed 
for Experiment 3.2. These exemplars were again selected from the sample from 
Storms (2001) and the categories were matched following the same criteria as used in 
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Experiment 3.1. To ensure that every exemplar would function as an intention, 
distracting or control cue, four sets were constructed that varied the function of 
exemplars between participants. Five exemplars of one category served as intention 
cues within each set leaving the other five exemplars from this selected category as 
distracting cues. The exemplars from the other category served as control cues. 
 Two types of fillers were used in the lexical decision task. First, there were 27 
words that did not belong to any of the categories. These were included to separate the 
experimental exemplars by at least three trials. Second, we used 45 non-words. These 
were 45 pronounceable letter strings, which were not part of the Dutch vocabulary. 
All fillers were matched to the length of the experimental exemplar words. 
 
Procedure 
The procedure of Experiment 3.2 was virtually identical to that of Experiment 3.1. 
The main difference was that participants memorized 20 category exemplar pairs and 
that they were instructed to form an intention to respond to five intention cues in the 
second phase of the experiment (half of the exemplars from one of the categories). 
The instruction read: After lexical decisions concerning five specific words we need 
you to press the space bar. These words will be presented when you press a button. 
These five intention cues were simultaneously presented on the screen for 30 seconds. 
In addition, the lexical decision task was modified such that each experimental cue 
was presented only once. Thus, the reaction time task consisted of 92 trials (5 
intention cues, 5 distracting cues, 10 control cues, 27 filler words and 45 filler non-
words). 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Two participants were excluded from the analysis because they pressed the space bar 
on every trial, leaving 53 participants for analysis. To deal with outliers we used the 
same data transformations as in Experiment 3.1. In Experiment 3.2, 2.6% of the 
lexical decisions were incorrect and 2.8% of the space bar responses were incorrect. 
These responses were again omitted from the following analyses.  
We performed a single factor (cue type: intention, distracting, control) within-
subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the lexical decision latencies to assess 
whether intentions caused inhibition of distracting cues. As expected, the main effect 
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of cue type was again reliable F(2, 104) = 4.28, p < .05. Simple effect tests revealed 
that this effect was due to increased reaction times to the distracting cues (M = 890 
ms, SD = 324) compared with both the intention cues (M = 839 ms, SD = 248) and 
control cues (M = 811 ms, SD = 190), respective comparisons F(1,52) = 4.40, p < .05, 
d = .18 and F(1,52) = 5.66, p < .05, d = .30. There was no reliable difference between 
the intention and control cues, F(1,52) = 1.41, ns. These results nicely replicate the 
results of Experiment 3.1 and indicate that cues that are related to intention cues are 
inhibited.  
To assess the functionality of the reported inhibition effect we computed the 
same correlation as in Experiment 3.1. This partial correlation between the strength of 
inhibition and reaction times on space bar presses while controlling for individual 
differences in overall reaction time speed was marginally reliable, pr(50) = -.27, p = 
.055. This correlation is of the same magnitude as the correlation in Experiment 1 and 
is an indication that successful goal directed behavior (space bar presses) is directly 
related to inhibition of distracting cues. 
 
General Discussion 
 
We conducted two experiments to examine the shielding of intentions from 
distracting stimuli. We expected that forming an intention would cause inhibition of 
semantically related and thus distracting cues compared with unrelated control cues. 
Both experiments confirmed that instructing participants to react to specific cues 
(intention cues) inhibits access to cues that might interfere with this intention 
(distracting cues) compared with control cues. This pattern of results is consistent 
with the idea that cognitive self-regulatory processes spontaneously shield intentions 
from distraction.  
We would like to emphasize that the main aim of the reported experiments 
was to show inhibition of distracting cues. Nonetheless, we also found some 
preliminary support for a functional account of this inhibition effect in Experiments 
3.1 and 3.2: As inhibition of distracting cues was stronger, participants were faster to 
execute their intentions. Although the correlation is moderate, it nevertheless nicely 
illustrates the functionality of the inhibition of distracting cues. 
The effect sizes of the inhibition of distracting cues as indicated by Cohen’s d 
are small. However, it should be noted that these inhibition effects resulted from 
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relatively subtle manipulations. In both experiments, participants were simply 
instructed to press the space bar after encountering intention cues during a lexical 
decision task. Even though the intention cues were displayed only once on the screen, 
lexical decisions to distracting cues were slower compared to control cues. 
Accordingly, considering such minimal inductions of intention, it is not surprising 
that the effects sizes obtained are rather small. 
The present results are consistent with, but also different from, research on 
goal shielding by Shah et al. (2002). Just as activating a focal goal inhibits alternative 
goals, forming an intention induces inhibition of distracting stimuli. However, the 
explanation for inhibition of alternative goals offered by Shah et al., i.e. overlearned 
inhibition of the alternative goal in pursuit of a focal goal, cannot explain the present 
results. Participants inhibit a word like grape in pursuit of pressing the space bar to 
orange. Because participants have probably never been in pursuit of this specific 
intention, inhibition of distraction is unlikely to be learned. Therefore, we propose a 
basic mechanism that can explain inhibition of distraction concerning new intentions: 
Any content that interferes with the content of an intention will receive inhibition. 
Consistent with this idea we found that stimuli merely semantically related to the 
content of an intention are inhibited compared with (non-distracting) semantically 
unrelated stimuli. Note, however, that the processes underlying shielding goals versus 
shielding intentions are not mutually exclusive, but complementary. In goal selection 
learned inhibitory relations inhibit alternative goals, whereas in goal execution 
intentions are shielded through inhibition of any interference. Thus, the present results 
give new insight into the path from goal setting to goal execution. 
The reasoning from the previous paragraph provides an interesting avenue for 
future research. One implication might be that if one specific distracting stimulus 
keeps interfering with one specific intention, an inhibitory relation develops between 
this intention and the distracting stimulus. Interestingly, such a process could explain 
how overlearned inhibitory relations between competing goals develop, i.e. inhibitory 
relations originate from repeated interference (Shah, et al., 2002; see also Fishbach, 
Friedman & Kruglanski, 2003).  
Because the paradigm used in the present research is adapted from research 
studying long-term memory processes, more specifically part-list cuing (e.g. Basden 
& Basden, 1995) and retrieval-induced forgetting (Anderson, Bjork & Bjork, 1994; 
Veling & van Knippenberg, 2004), it is important to note that such previously 
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reported long-term memory processes cannot account for the present data2. Part-list 
cuing refers to the phenomenon that presenting participants with part of a previously 
studied list impairs recall of the whole list compared with a condition in which no part 
of the list is presented. Part-list cuing effects are likely caused by a disruption of 
retrieval processes when part of the list is available during retrieval of the whole list 
(Basden & Basden, 1995). The key issue is that part-list cuing is not obtained when 
the presentation of part of the list (in our case presentation of intention cues) and 
measurement of memory for the whole list (in our case in the lexical decision task) 
are separated (for a discussion of these whole-part-whole experiments see Basden and 
Basden, 1995). Moreover, because our main dependent variable (lexical decision) taps 
accessibility rather than retrieval processes, part-list cuing is further eliminated as an 
underlying process. Thus, another process is required to account for the inhibition of 
distracting cues.  
In a related vein, research on retrieval-induced forgetting has repeatedly 
shown that when part of a previously studied list and the whole studied list are 
presented in separated phases of an experiment, mere presentation of part of the list is 
not sufficient to obtain any inhibition when memory for the whole list is tested 
(Anderson, Bjork & Bjork, 2000; Bäuml, 2002). Based on these arguments we argue 
that our results do not merely reflect an old long-term memory phenomenon, but are 
new because they show that inhibition of part of the list (i.e. the inhibition of 
distracting cues) can be found when it interferes with keeping an intention in mind. 
The current data have interesting implications for theorizing on the status of 
intentions in memory. Previous research on this subject suggests that intentions are in 
a constant state of heightened activation (the intention superiority effect; Goschke & 
Kuhl, 1993; Marsh, Hicks, & Bink, 1998). However, this previous research is based 
on a comparison between two kinds of stimuli: intention stimuli and other to be 
remembered stimuli. On the basis of our research it seems arguable that the to be 
remembered stimuli are inhibited to prevent them from interfering with the intention 
stimuli. This could mean that intentions are either in a heightened state of activation, 
or distracting stimuli are in a lowered state of activation, or both. However, because 
the stimuli and research procedures from the present experiments differ substantially 
from these earlier experiments, it is difficult to draw conclusions based on this 
comparison. Nevertheless, future research on the intention superiority effect (Goschke 
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& Kuhl, 1993) may include a control condition to reveal facilitory and inhibitory 
effects independently. 
The reported experiments aimed to show that intentions spontaneously shield 
the content of concrete intentions from distraction by inhibiting interfering content. 
We obtained repeated evidence that intentions can indeed induce inhibition of cues 
that might interfere intention execution. Furthermore, this inhibition seems functional 
because it is positively related to task performance. 
 
Endnotes 
 
1. All stimuli can be obtained from Harm Veling. 
2. We would like to thank Jim Uleman and an anonymous reviewer for drawing our 
attention to this issue.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Intention formation induces episodic inhibition of 
distracting stimuli* 
 
 
Keeping in mind what to do is indispensable for successful goal pursuit. However, 
such maintenance of intentional information in memory may not be as straightforward 
as it seems. For instance, imagine that you just taught a class for the first time, and 
learned the names of all ten participants. After class, five participants come up to you 
asking for some additional information. You promise them to e-mail this information 
when you get to your office. To ensure that this intention will be completed 
successfully, it is essential to keep the names of these five participants in memory. 
However, because you just learned ten new names it can be rather difficult not to get 
confused about whom to e-mail. This kind of situation is encountered frequently in 
everyday life as we go about maintaining in memory how to navigate to find your 
destination in an unfamiliar city, who to invite for a party, which groceries to buy 
when you go to the supermarket, and so forth. In general, there is abundant distraction 
in everyday life that may interfere with keeping such intentional content in mind. 
Still, many people seem able to regulate their behavior in a way that ensures intention 
completion even in the presence of many distracting stimuli. The nature of the process 
that targets the status of distracting stimuli during goal pursuit is the focus of the 
current experiment. 
 The idea that intentions are protected from distraction can be found in several 
volitional approaches to goal striving (e.g. Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987; 
Gollwitzer, 1990; Kuhl, 1987, 2000; Mischel, Cantor, & Feldman, 1996). According 
to a model of action control by Kuhl (1987), protection from distraction originates 
from the nature of intentions. Kuhl describes an intention as “…an activated plan to 
                                                 
*
 This chapter is based on Veling, H., & van Knippenberg, A. (2006b). Keeping an 
uncompleted intention in mind induces episodic inhibition of distracting stimuli. 
Manuscript under review. 
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which an actor committed herself or himself…” (p. 282). This definition entails two 
distinct properties of intentions that are represented in separate memory systems. First 
of all, intentions have a structural component that consists of the content of the 
intention. This content includes both the plan (i.e. what to do) and behavioral 
programs for intention execution. In addition, intentions require the activation of a 
motivational system. This motivational maintenance system (MMS) is free of content, 
but, when activated, directs activation to any structure that is currently most 
accessible in content specific memory systems. MMS ensures that an activated plan 
remains active over time and is protected against competing plans (Kuhl, 1987; see 
also J. R. Anderson’s (1983) adaptive control of thought (ACT*) model for enhanced 
accessibility of intention related information).  
However, although the MMS can account for shielding a specific intention 
from irrelevant information (i.e. by keeping the intention activated) it does not address 
what happens when distracting stimuli are present. As outlined above, the MMS does 
not discriminate on the basis of content, but sends activation to any content that is 
most accessible in other memory systems. This would become problematic in an 
environment where many current goal-irrelevant, but nevertheless attention-grabbing 
stimuli are near. Once attention is directed towards an interesting stimulus (and 
therefore receives activation in content specific memory systems) the current intention 
could be deprived of activation from the MMS and as a result be forgotten. It seems 
that in situations in which such distracting stimuli are present, additional regulatory 
processes are required to shield intentions from oblivion.  
 Because the MMS sends activation on the basis of content accessibility and 
not content itself, the presumed additional regulation is most likely controlled by 
content-specific memory systems. These systems can determine whether certain 
specific attention-grabbing stimuli might interfere with the content of an intention, 
and as a result fend off these distractions. However, the question remains how 
content-specific mechanisms resolve which information should be fended off. It 
would be quite detrimental for human functioning when, once an intention is formed, 
just any other information is warded off. This would mean that we would become 
preoccupied with the intention without the ability to further react flexibly to our 
environment (see Norman & Shallice, 1986). From a functional perspective it seems 
to be advantageous to avert information only when it might interfere with the 
representation of intentions in memory. 
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 Although selective inhibition of distracting stimuli in the domain of intentions 
has not yet been examined often, inhibition of distracting information compared with 
neutral information has already been studied repeatedly in the domain of long-term 
memory, specifically retrieval-induced forgetting (Anderson, Bjork & Bjork, 1994). 
In the retrieval-induced forgetting paradigm participants memorize category-exemplar 
pairs from two or more semantic categories (e.g. FRUIT-mango, FRUIT-grape, 
ANIMAL-lion, ANIMAL-giraffe). After this study phase participants perform 
retrieval practice on half of the exemplars of some of the studied categories by means 
of category-word stem completion (e.g. FRUIT-ma—). After retrieval practice, recall 
or accessibility of all studied exemplars is measured. Research in this domain has 
shown that recall (e.g. M. C. Anderson, Bjork & Bjork, 1994; M. C. Anderson & 
Spellman, 1995) and accessibility (Veling & van Knippenberg, 2004) of unpracticed 
exemplars from the practiced categories (e.g. grape) is inferior to recall and 
accessibility of unpracticed exemplars from the unpracticed categories (e.g. lion, 
giraffe). The explanation for this effect is that retrieving a subset of exemplars from a 
semantic category during retrieval practice inhibits access to distracting exemplars 
from the same category, to facilitate the selection of the to be retrieved exemplars.  
Consistent with this inhibition of distracting stimuli explanation, Anderson, 
Bjork and Bjork (2000) and Bäuml (2002) have shown that merely presenting some 
exemplars from a previously studied semantic category does not elicit inhibition of 
non-presented exemplars from the same category. Only when a selection problem 
arises, as is the case in retrieving a specific memory representation with related 
presentations present, inhibitory processes are recruited to inhibit these distracting 
stimuli. In addition, Anderson, Bjork and Bjork (1994) have shown that after repeated 
retrieval of a specific memory representation, memory for strong associates of this 
repeatedly retrieved memory representation is worse than memory for weak 
associates. This result indicates that inhibitory processes are indeed specifically 
directed to stimuli that might interfere with selection of an intended target memory 
representation (for further recent empirical support of this inhibitory explanation see 
Johansson, Aslan, Bäuml, Gäbel, & Mecklinger, in press).  
M. C. Anderson (2003) and Veling & van Knippenberg (2006a) have argued 
that inhibitory mechanisms that aid selection of information in long-term memory 
might also operate to shield intentions from distracting stimuli. Both selection of 
information in long-term memory and maintaining intentions active in memory 
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benefit from inhibition of distracting stimuli in order to complete their respective 
tasks. However, the question arises how and when inhibitory processes are recruited. 
Whereas research on retrieval-induced forgetting assumes that inhibitory processes 
operate during recall of a target representation (as is evident by the fact that merely 
presenting a memory representation does not cause inhibition of distracting stimuli; 
see also Johanson et al., in press), this process cannot be readily applied to the process 
of maintaining an intention in mind, because selection for the target representation 
(i.e. intentional information) is already done. That is, you now what to do when you 
form an intention (i.e. there is no retrieval problem), but the problem is to shield this 
intentional content against distracting stimuli until this intention is executed or 
abandoned. 
Inhibition of distracting stimuli after selection of a target stimulus has been 
observed in negative priming experiments (e.g. Tipper, 1985; for reviews see Fox, 
1995; May, Kane & Hasher, 1995; Tipper, 2001). In a negative-priming paradigm 
participants are asked to select a target, using a cue such as color, and respond to the 
identity of that stimulus in the presence of one or more distracting stimuli (which are 
called distractors). The negative priming effect shows that when a distractor on trial n 
– 1 becomes the target on trial n, responding is slower than when a new target is 
presented on trial n. Importantly, negative priming effects are absent (e.g. Neill & 
Westberry, 1987) or reversed (e.g. Neumann & DeSchepper, 1992) when the time 
between trial n –1 and trial n is short, but develops sometime after selection (see May 
et al., 1995). In addition, negative priming effects are observable several seconds after 
target selection, and are even apparent after processing other information between 
trials n –1 and n (Tipper, Weaver, Cameron, Brehaut, Bastedo, 1991). May et al. 
(1995) have concluded that these findings suggest that inhibition functions after 
selection to preserve the distinction between goal-relevant and goal-irrelevant 
information, once this distinction has been established. 
In line with this reasoning, we argue that once an intention is formed (i.e. a 
target is selected), the distinction between intentional content and non-intentional 
content is maintained by inhibiting distracting stimuli. The nature of distracting 
stimuli relating to intentions, however, is different from distractors in negative 
priming experiments. Whereas distractors in negative priming are distracting because 
they are displayed in presence of the target (i.e. distraction is external), distracting 
stimuli concerning intentional information may be internal. For instance, while 
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keeping five names of students in mind, names of other students may be distracting 
without actually being present, but because they are semantically related and 
previously learned in the same context. As such, the nature of distraction related to 
intentions is more similar to distraction in retrieval-induced forgetting research (i.e. 
strong associates to the memory representation). Nevertheless, the underlying 
cognitive mechanism involved to inhibit these distracting stimuli might be 
comparable to the process responsible for negative priming effects (for similar views 
see M. C. Anderson & Spellman, 1995; Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1998).  
 To test the idea that distracting stimuli are inhibited after intention formation, 
Veling & van Knippenberg (2006a) conducted two experiments in which they asked 
participants to do a lexical decision task and in addition press the space bar after 
lexical decisions towards a selection of specific words (i.e. intention words). During 
this lexical decision task, they also presented words that were previously studied and 
semantically related to the intention words (i.e. distracting words) and previously 
studied semantically unrelated words (i.e. control words). Results showed slower 
lexical decisions towards distracting words compared with both intention words and 
control words. This latter comparison is important, because it indicates that distracting 
words were indeed inhibited. 
 However, a problem with the paradigm just described is that participants 
performed a lexical decision task and simultaneously scanned for intention words. 
Consequently, every word in the lexical decision task was probably evaluated as a 
potential word (lexical decision) and as a potential intention cue (i.e. whether the 
space bar should be pressed after the lexical decision). Therefore, slower lexical 
decisions towards distracting words could either indicate that these words were slower 
recognized as words or that they were slower rejected as potential intention cues or 
both. Thus, it is not clear whether the described inhibition effect (Veling & van 
Knippenberg, 2006a) concerns inhibition of semantic access towards distracting 
words, i.e. semantic inhibition, or inhibition of distracting words as potential intention 
cues, i.e. episodic inhibition (for episodic priming effects in a lexical decision task see 
Durgunoglu & Neely, 1987). 
To solve this problem it is useful to theorize about where the inhibition of 
distracting stimuli in maintaining an intention in mind would take place. A widely 
used distinction in memory systems is that between episodic and semantic memory 
(Tulving, 1983). According to this distinction, information can be represented in 
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separate memory modules. An episodic memory representation entails storage of 
concrete contextual information such as details of events whereas a semantic 
representation is decontextualized and entails memory for facts and lexical meaning. 
Comparable distinctions can be found in a number of memory models (e.g. 
McCelland, McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995; Semin & Smith, 1999). As described 
above, the content of an intention concerns information that specifies what to do (e.g. 
whom to e-mail what). Because such content is related to a distinct time and place 
(i.e. it consists of concrete contextual information) the content of the intention is 
stored in episodic memory (Kuhl, 1987).  
To successfully shield an intention from distracting stimuli then (i.e. to retain 
the distinction between goal-relevant and goal-irrelevant information), it is important 
to inhibit information that might interfere with this intention in episodic memory. As 
described above, such potential interference may consist of memory representations 
that are strong associates of the intentional content. As a result, we expect that, after 
intention formation, stimuli that are strong associates of this intention receive 
inhibition in episodic rather than semantic memory, so that interference is prevented 
(for a related discussion between semantic vs. episodic inhibition see Perfect, Moulin, 
Conway, & Perry, 2002). When we apply this reasoning to the opening example we 
would expect that after an intention is formed to e-mail five specific students, strong 
associates of this intention (e.g. names of other students that attend the same course) 
are inhibited in episodic memory compared with neutral information (e.g. what the 
classroom looked like) to avoid interference pertaining to the intention.  
 
Overview 
 
In the current experiment we first asked participants to press the space bar whenever a 
fruit (e.g. mango, grape etc.), animal (e.g. lion, giraffe etc.), or profession (teacher, 
notary etc.) was presented. This phase was included to ensure that all stimuli in this 
experiment were activated in memory, and inhibition of distracting stimuli would be 
necessary for maintaining the intention in mind as described next. After this first task, 
we asked participants to form an intention to press the space bar to specific stimuli in 
the final task of the experiment (e.g. press space bar when you see the word mango or 
lion). Before executing this intention, we measured accessibility of intention words 
(e.g. mango, lion), words semantically related to this intention (e.g. grape, giraffe), 
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and control words (e.g. teacher, notary). We expected episodic rather than semantic 
inhibition of words related to the intention (e.g. grape, giraffe), when inhibition was 
measured before intention execution. We tested this hypothesis by measuring 
accessibility by means of either a recognition task (tapping episodic memory) or a 
lexical decision task (tapping semantic memory). We hypothesized slower responses 
towards stimuli that are related to intentional stimuli (e.g. grape, giraffe) compared 
with stimuli that are unrelated to intention relevant stimuli (e.g. teacher, notary) in the 
recognition task only. 
 
Method 
 
Participants and design 
Sixty undergraduate students participated in exchange for €2 (approximately $2.40). 
The design is a 3(stimulus type: intention, distracting, control) by 2(task type: 
recognition vs. lexical decision) mixed design with repeated measures on the first 
factor. 
 
Materials and procedure 
See Figure 4.1 for an outline of the experimental procedure. Participants were tested 
individually and read self-paced through instructions on a computer screen. We first 
instructed participants to press the space bar towards any stimulus from three 
semantic categories (fruits, animals and professions) and not towards stimuli from 
three other categories (clothing, sports and musical instruments). We presented 6 
stimuli of each category in random order. These stimuli were selected from a study in 
which Dutch category-exemplar pairs were generated (Storms, 2001). Participants 
received feedback whenever they responded erroneously. This phase was included to 
activate all stimuli in memory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PRESENTATION PHASE 
Press space bar whenever fruits, animals or 
professions are presented (six stimuli per category) 
and not when fillers are presented (18 stimuli) 
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Figure 4.1  Outline of experimental procedure of Experiment 4.1. 
 
 
Next, participants read that they would receive the task they just finished once more 
in the third phase of the experiment. However, instead of pressing the space bar in 
response to any fruit, animal and profession, participants were asked to form an 
intention to press the space bar only in response to six specific stimuli from two 
categories (e.g. strawberry, mango, plum, elephant, rabbit, lion) in the third part of the 
experiment. These six exemplars were then simultaneously presented for 30 s. 
Besides these intention stimuli this manipulation generated two kinds of intention-
irrelevant stimuli. First of all, the manipulation created stimuli that are semantically 
related to the intention stimuli (e.g. melon, grape, lemon, giraffe, camel, bull). 
Because these stimuli are semantically related to the intention stimuli we will call 
these stimuli distracting stimuli. In addition, there are stimuli that are semantically 
unrelated to the intention stimuli (e.g. teacher, hairdresser, notary, lawyer, butcher, 
pilot) as these stimuli were presented as part of a different semantic category. We will 
refer to these stimuli as control stimuli. To ensure that every exemplar would function 
INTENTION FORMATION PHASE 
Form an intention to press the space bar towards 
six specific stimuli (three of two categories) in the 
final phase of the experiment 
ACCESSIBILITY MEASURE 
Presentation of either a recognition task or a lexical 
decision task (between subjects) including all fruits, 
animals, professionals and fillers 
INTENTION EXECUTION PHASE 
Same as the presentation phase, but participants 
are now asked to press the space bar only after 
presentation of stimuli to which they previously 
formed an intention 
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as an intention stimulus, distracting stimulus or control stimulus, six sets were 
constructed in which the function of exemplars varied between participants.  
Before executing this intention we measured accessibility of all stimuli 
presented in the first phase by means of either a recognition task or a lexical decision 
task. In the recognition task condition participants read that words presented on the 
screen would be either new or taken from the first phase of the experiment. In 
addition, these participants read that some new words were new exemplars from the 
same categories they had seen in the first phase. Thus, their recognition decision 
could not be based on category membership alone. In the lexical decision condition 
participants read that the task was to decide whether letter-strings presented on the 
computer screen were Dutch words. To ensure fast reaction times we included a 
response window of 3 s in both tasks. When a reaction time exceeded this window 
participants received an instruction to respond faster. 
In both the recognition task and the lexical decision task an asterisk preceded 
presentation of the stimuli. After a random interval of between 1 and 1.5 s the target 
replaced the asterisk and participants were asked to respond as quickly and accurately 
as possible. The intertrial interval was 1.5 s. Two orders of stimulus presentation (new 
words and old words in the recognition task or words and non-words in the lexical 
decision task) were constructed to prevent the same response from occurring more 
than three times in a row. Within these two orders the stimuli were randomly selected. 
One of these orders was randomly selected between participants. 
Apart from 36 old words from the first phase of the experiment, the 
recognition task encompassed two types of filler words. To ensure that decisions in 
the recognition task could not be based on category membership alone, we included 3 
new exemplars of each semantic category of old words (fruits, animals, professions, 
clothing, sports, musical instruments; a total of 18 exemplars). In addition, we 
presented 18 words that did not belong to any of the categories. Thus, the recognition 
task included 72 trials and the probability of encountering a new word was 50%.  
In the lexical decision task we presented participants with the 18 experimental 
exemplars, nine new words from the experimental categories (fruits, animals, 
clothing), 27 new words that were not part of any of the categories, and we included 
54 pronounceable letter strings that are not part of the Dutch vocabulary as non-
words. These new words and non-words were matched for word length to the 
experimental exemplars. Consequently, the lexical decision task consisted of 108 
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trials and the probability of encountering an existing word was 50%. Before starting 
the lexical decision task participants received six practice trials (including three words 
and three non-words). 
The final intention execution phase was identical to the first phase of the 
experiment except for two changes. First, participants were instructed to press the 
space bar in response to the exemplars for which they previously formed an intention 
only. In addition, they did not receive feedback whenever they made an erroneous 
response1. Afterwards they were thanked and paid for their participation. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
One participant was excluded from the following analyses because this participant 
made an erroneous recognition decision in more than 33% of the trials (which was 
more than three standard deviations above the mean error rate in the recognition task 
condition). Next, we excluded trials in which a response was incorrect (15.5% of 
responses in the recognition task condition and 3.5 % of the responses in the lexical 
decision task condition) and trials in which response latencies exceeded the window 
limit (0.5% and 0.3% for the recognition task and lexical decision task respectively). 
Analyses were performed on log-transformed data, but, for the sake of clarity, we 
report non-transformed means. 
To test whether forming an intention causes inhibition of distracting stimuli in 
the recognition task only, we performed a stimulus type (intention, distracting, 
control) by task type (recognition or lexical decision) mixed analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with repeated measures on the first factor. These data are displayed in 
Figure 4.2. First of all, a main effect of task type emerged. Participants in the 
recognition task condition reacted slower (M = 801 ms, SD = 136) than participants in 
the lexical decision task condition (M = 594 ms, SD = 129), F(1, 57) = 41.22, partial 
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η2 = .42, p < .05. More important, however, the predicted interaction between 
stimulus type and task type was reliable, F(2, 114) = 8.52, partial η2 = .13, p < .05.  
 
 
Figure 4.2.  Reaction time latencies as a function of the type of task and the 
type of stimulus in Experiment 4.1. 
 
 
In the recognition task condition (right side of Figure 4.2) simple effect tests revealed 
increased reaction times to distracting stimuli (M = 861 ms, SD = 183) compared with 
both intention stimuli (M = 759 ms, SD = 142) and control stimuli (M = 784 ms, SD = 
138), respective comparisons F(1, 28) = 17.07, partial η2 = .38, p < .05 and F(1, 28) = 
9.35, partial η2 = .25, p < .05. The latter test, i.e. the contrast between distracting 
stimuli and control stimuli is crucial in demonstrating the occurrence of inhibition. 
Only strong associates to the intention stimuli receive inhibition. Thus, in a distracting 
context, content-specific memory protects the content of intentions by inhibiting 
content that, through intrusion, might impede proper intention execution. This pattern 
of results is consistent with our hypothesis and shows that stimuli that might interfere 
with an intention are indeed inhibited episodically. Finally, there was no reliable 
difference between the intention and control stimuli, F(1, 28) = 2.37, partial η2 = .08, 
p = .14.  
In the lexical decision task condition (left side of Figure 4.2), there were no 
reliable differences between distracting stimuli (M = 581 ms, SD = 114) and either 
intention stimuli (M = 602 ms, SD = 148) or control stimuli (M = 601 ms, SD = 157) 
respective comparisons, F(1, 29) = 1.54, partial η2 = .05, p = .22 and F(1, 29) < 1. 
The comparison between intention and control stimuli was also not reliable, F(1, 29) 
< 1. So, in contrast to episodic accessibility, semantic accessibility of the stimuli was 
not affected by our intention formation manipulation. That is, when an intention is 
formed to respond to mango, grape is inhibited episodically, but not semantically. 
This result is line with our hypothesis that inhibition of potential interference is 
targeted very specifically to the memory module where shielding from potential 
interference is necessary. As intentions are episodic in nature, the distinction between 
goal-relevant and goal-irrelevant information is maintained in episodic memory only. 
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As is apparent from Figure 4.2, we did not obtain a facilitation effect of 
intention stimuli compared with control stimuli. It is important to point out that we do 
think that intentions have a special status in memory in terms of activation. This 
aspect of intentions is well documented both in theorizing on motivation, and research 
concerning the representation of intentional information in memory (e.g. J. R. 
Anderson, 1983; Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; Kuhl, 1987, 2000; Lau, Rogers, Haggard, & 
Passingham, 2004; Marsh, Hicks, & Bink, 1998). However, the present paradigm was 
designed to show inhibition of distracting stimuli and not to show enhanced activation 
of intention related content. In order to achieve this goal, we first presented 
participants with all stimuli and asked them to react to these stimuli based on their 
category membership. This procedure ensured that all stimuli became highly 
activated. As a result, protecting an intention could not be achieved by enhancing 
activation of intention stimuli (i.e. because all stimuli are already activated), but 
protection was realized by inhibiting distracting stimuli instead2. 
 
 
 
General Discussion 
 
The present experiment yields two important findings concerning the shielding of 
intentions from distraction. First of all, we have found evidence that forming an 
intention induces inhibition of information that is related to the content of this 
intention. This counterintuitive result suggests that intentions are protected from 
interference by inhibiting stimuli that might interfere with these intentions due to their 
semantic interrelations. Secondly, we showed that this inhibition is targeted very 
specifically to the episodic representation of distracting information. This result is 
discussed more comprehensively below. 
Although the present paradigm is based on research on retrieval-induced 
forgetting, the present inhibition effect is qualitatively different from inhibition of 
interfering memory representations in retrieval-induced forgetting research. 
Specifically, in previous research Veling and van Knippenberg (2004) showed that 
retrieving a target memory representation from long-term memory, by means of 
category word stem completion (e.g. FRUIT - ma—), induces inhibition of distracting 
memory representations on both a recognition task (Experiment 1) and a lexical 
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decision task (Experiment 2). This difference in the nature of intention-induced 
inhibition of potential interference (IIII) compared with retrieval-induced inhibition of 
potential interference (RIII) can be readily explained by considering the 
manipulations involved in these respective paradigms.  
RIII concerns inhibition of distracting words during retrieval of words from 
long-term memory on the basis of cued word stem completion (e.g. FRUIT - ma—). 
This process may involve either episodic memory, i.e. retrieving a studied word from 
a previous phase of the experiment (e.g. Anderson, Bjork & Bjork, 1994), or semantic 
memory, i.e. retrieving a specific exemplar from a semantic category (see Bäuml, 
2002 or Johnson & Anderson, 2004), or both. During search for the target 
representation, inhibitory processes facilitate retrieval of a memory representation by 
inhibiting semantic associates of the to be retrieved target representation in either 
semantic memory or episodic memory (Johnson & Anderson, 2004) or both, 
depending on the strategy of the participant. Hence, word stem completion may lead 
to inhibition in either episodic memory or semantic memory.  
The manipulation we used to examine IIII consisted of asking participants to 
form an intention to react to a subset of words from previously presented categories. 
These specific stimuli were not retrieved from long-term memory by the participants, 
but presented on a computer screen. As a result, there was no reason for participants 
to search their semantic memory. However, it was important to keep an accurate 
episodic representation of the intention in mind. Inhibition of distracting stimuli, in 
the present paradigm, operated to amplify the distinction between goal-relevant and 
goal-irrelevant information. Because the content of the intention was episodic in 
nature, this distinction was maintained in episodic memory. To achieve this goal, 
memory representations that are strong associates of the content of intentions were 
subjected to inhibition in episodic memory. This way interference concerning 
intentional information was prevented and the distinction between goal-relevant and 
goal-irrelevant information was maintained. In line with this purely episodic memory 
account, we obtained no semantic inhibition of the distracting stimuli, because 
semantic memory was not involved in intention formation. As a result, the distinction 
between goal-relevant and goal-irrelevant information was not monitored in semantic 
memory. Nevertheless, we like to point out that semantic inhibition of distracting 
stimuli may be possible when an intention has a strong semantic basis. This issue will 
be discussed shortly.  
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Although the present research is related to research on the intention superiority 
effect (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; Marsch, Hicks, & Bink, 1998), because it addresses 
the status of intentional information in memory, it nevertheless differs in an important 
aspect from research in this area. As a result, the current results have both 
consistencies and seeming inconsistencies with that research domain. Consistent with 
research on intention superiority, the current research indicates that intentions have a 
special status in memory, because it shows that any information potentially interfering 
with intentional information is inhibited.  
A seeming inconsistency with research on intention superiority is that Marsh, 
Hicks, & Bink (1998) found a special status of intentional information in terms of 
enhanced activation on a lexical decision task towards intentional stimuli, whereas we 
did not obtain any inhibition effect of distracting stimuli on lexical decisions. This 
seems inconsistent because both effects concern the shielding of intentions in 
memory. However, this difference in research outcomes might be explained by 
considering the difference in the type of intentional information used. Marsh et al., 
used scripts consisting of related action phrases including both verbs and nouns (e.g. 
insert the filter, pour the water). Importantly, in their research the intentional 
information consists of the to be performed action itself. As such, these intentions 
may have an episodic component (memorizing what to do in the beginning of the 
experiment) as well as semantic components (i.e. what pouring or water is). Both 
these components are relevant for intention execution. In the paradigm we used, the 
content of the intention (e.g. mango) includes no information about what to do (press 
the space bar when you see it), but merely serves as an episodically based response 
trigger (see also Einstein et al. 2005). Therefore, we neither expected nor obtained 
effects on a lexical decision task. Future research may investigate inhibitory processes 
concerning shielding of intentions that are similar to the ones in intention superiority 
research. We think it is plausible that inhibition of distracting information concerning 
such intentions operates in both episodic and semantic memory. At the present, we 
like to highlight that the current findings cannot be generalized to all intentions, but 
apply, at least, to episodically based intentions such as the one described in the first 
paragraph of this paper. Hence, the current research gives insight in part of the micro-
cognitive processes underlying the shielding of intentions.  
On the other hand, research concerning the detection of intentional cues 
embedded in a background task (i.e. event-based prospective memory) has shown 
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increased lexical decision latencies towards intentional stimuli compared with neutral 
stimuli, when the lexical decision task is the background task (Marsh, Hicks & 
Watson, 2002), and even when accessibility of intention cues is measured with a 
lexical decision task independent from the background task (Einstein et al. 2005; 
Experiment 5). In this research domain the increased lexical decision latencies are 
interpreted as indicative of spontaneous retrieval of the intention (Einstein et al., 
2005) or a preparation to respond (Marsh et al., 2002). The fact that we did not obtain 
increased lexical decisions towards intentional cues could be due to methodological 
differences. Specifically, while the current research is similar to research on event-
based prospective memory in terms of content of the intention (i.e. specific cues), the 
procedure is more comparable to research on intention superiority (e.g. Goschke & 
Kuhl, 1993). As a result, the participants in the current research may have experienced 
the lexical decision task differently (maybe as more independent) than participants in 
the research from Einstein et al. (2005). However, we like to stress that these 
methodological differences complicate direct comparisons between the current 
research and the aforementioned research. Future research might focus on integrating 
insights from different domains, as all research just described concerns the status of 
intentional information in memory. 
The present research indicates that motivation and cognition interact to protect 
intentions from interference: When there is a need to distinguish goal-relevant from 
goal-irrelevant information, distracting stimuli that might interfere with the content of 
this intention are targeted by inhibitory processes in episodic memory. As such the 
current research adds to volitional theories on goal striving by specifying part of the 
nature and mechanism by which intentions are protected from oblivion. 
 
Endnotes 
 
1. Results of this intention execution phase are not reported because a) the focus of 
the present research is on the status of intention related stimuli before or after 
intention execution and b) in this experiment we observed no reliable relations 
between recognition latencies on the one hand and reaction times to intention cues in 
the intention execution phase on the other hand. 
2. On the other hand, Goschke and Kuhl (1993) found enhanced activation of 
intentional information compared with neutral information even though all 
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information was memorized in the first phase of the experiment. However, the 
intentional information in their research consists of scripts involving multiple related 
actions (e.g. spread the table cloth, polish the glasses etc.), so that it is difficult to 
directly compare our research with research on intention superiority (see Einstein et 
al. 2005 for a similar argument). This issue is discussed extensively in the General 
Discussion section. 
 
  67  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
Inhibiting distracting stimuli involves an active inhibitory 
process* 
 
 
In the preceding chapters we have obtained repeated evidence that forming an 
intention is sufficient to produce inhibition of distracting stimuli. In this final 
empirical chapter we will explore two potential moderators of such inhibition. In 
doing so we aim to provide direct evidence that the slower responses towards 
distracting stimuli in a recognition task (see Chapter 4) are the result of an active 
inhibitory process that protects intentions from distraction. We intend to accomplish 
this by showing that the inhibition of distracting stimuli is (a) caused by an inhibitory 
mechanism that relies on executive control capacity (Experiment 5.1) and (b) that this 
inhibition is in place until the intention is completed (Experiment 5.2). Such evidence 
would provide support for our claim that an active inhibitory process is involved to 
deal with distraction for as long as an intention needs to be shielded. 
 The question of whether reduced accessibility of distracting information is 
caused by an active inhibitory process is hard to assess directly. The problem 
concerning this issue is twofold. Firstly, it is difficult to observe or measure an active 
inhibitory process itself. The most direct evidence for the existence of active 
inhibitory processes stems from recent neurological evidence that shows that 
activation of specific brain areas is related to cognitive inhibition (operationalized as 
forgetting of specific stimuli; Anderson et al., 2004; Johansson, Aslan, Bäuml, Gäbel 
& Mecklinger, in press). However, in most cases inhibitory processes are examined 
by measuring their behavioral manifestations. This raises the second problem with 
examining an active inhibitory process. The outcome of an active inhibitory process 
                                                 
*
 Part of this chapter is based on Veling, H., & van Knippenberg, A. (2006b). Keeping 
an uncompleted intention in mind induces episodic inhibition of distracting stimuli. 
Manuscript under review. Experiment 5.1 was conducted in collaboration with 
Dimitri van der Linden. 
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(i.e. the decreased level of activation of an inhibited memory representation) is not, in 
itself, unequivocal evidence that an active inhibitory process was operating. There is 
still the possibility that some (unknown) passive inhibitory process is operating that 
produces a similar effect. Thus, we deemed it important to examine the involvement 
of an active inhibitory process in a more direct manner. 
 A way to examine whether an active inhibitory process accompanies intention 
formation would be to manipulate the extent that participants are able to draw upon 
resources that are required for using inhibitory control. In cases where participants 
cannot rely on their inhibitory control processes after intention formation, we would 
expect no inhibition of distracting stimuli. In contrast, when participants have access 
to resources that are needed for implementing inhibitory control, we do expect 
inhibition of distracing stimuli to occur. But how can the ability to inhibit information 
be manipulated? In order to address this question it is important to establish more 
precisely what an inhibitory process means.  
 The ability to actively inhibit information in memory can be viewed as an 
executive control process (Anderson, 2003; Anderson & Green, 2001; Levy & 
Anderson, 2002; Johansson et al., in press). Executive control can be defined as the 
ability to “… orchestrate thought and action in accordance with internal goals” (Miller 
& Cohen, 2001; pp. 167). Importantly, executive control is not critical for performing 
simple or automatic behaviors (e.g. eye blinking or drinking a glass of water), but is 
vital when “top-down” processing is needed (i.e. in cases where behavior must be 
guided by intentions or internal states; Miller & Cohen, 2001). Examples of tasks that 
require such top-down control are the color stroop task and the Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Task (WCST). For example, in the WSTC participants are asked to sort cards 
according to color, shape, or number of symbols presented on the cards, and the 
sorting rule changes periodically. Thus, any card can be associated with several 
possible actions, dependent on the currently active rule. As a result, no single stimulus 
response mapping will work and correct sorting is determined by whichever rule is 
presently in effect. It is assumed that in order to be successful in this task after a 
change in rule, executive control is necessary to override responding to the previous 
rule in favor of the new rule (i.e. by inhibiting the previous rule). Consistent with this 
assumption is the finding that people with brain damage in areas were executive 
control is located (prefrontal cortex) can learn an initial rule, but have great difficulty 
when the rule varies (Milner, 1963). This is explained in terms of lacking inhibition. 
Active Inhibition 
 
 69  
In addition, children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), which is 
related to a general deficit in executive control, have also difficulty with the WCST 
(Barkley, 1997). This research illustrates the idea that executive control is imperative 
for successful task performance in demanding situations where behavior should be 
guided by internally represented goals. 
Recently evidence has accumulated that suggests that the mechanisms 
underlying successful performance in tasks such as the WCST, are also essential in 
the control of long-term memory representations (Levy & Anderson, 2002). More 
specifically, recent neuro-imaging research has shown that the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC) is activated when participants try to override (or suppress) the 
retrieval of a previously learned memory representation (Anderson et al., 2004); The 
DLPFC is also active when participants take the WCST (Berman et al., 1995). 
Moreover, Johansson et al. (in press) have shown that sustained prefrontal event 
related potentials (ERPs) are related to forgetting of distracting information after the 
retrieval of a target representation. These results suggest that an active inhibitory 
mechanism operates in the prefrontal cortex that decreases the activation level of 
distracting or unwanted memory representations.  
The fact that the same neural area is active in seemingly different tasks (i.e. 
the WCST versus retrieval of a memory representation) is an indication that a similar 
underlying mechanism is at work in these tasks. This means that in order to assess the 
role of inhibitory processes in averting information that might interfere with an 
ongoing intention, a manipulation that impedes executive control would be useful: 
Those people that cannot use their executive control processes to full extent should be 
unable to inhibit distracting information. 
A manipulation that has been used successfully to compromise executive 
control is mental fatigue (van der Linden et al., 2003). Mental fatigue arises when 
participants are working on cognitively demanding tasks for a considerable amount of 
time. Van der Linden et al. have shown that mental fatigue does not hamper any task 
performance, but particularly targets executive control processes. Specifically, they 
have shown that mental fatigue does not impair execution of simple tasks (such as the 
forward digit span), whereas complex tasks that require executive control (e.g. the 
WCST or the Tower of London) proved difficult to perform under conditions of 
mental fatigue (van der Linden et al). If we are correct in assuming that an inhibitory 
process targets distracting stimuli, then inhibition should disappear when participants 
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are unable to draw upon their executive control processes as is the case with mental 
fatigue. This is what we aimed to test in Experiment 5.1  
 
Experiment 5.1 
 
The method of Experiment 5.1 is identical to the recognition task condition of 
Experiment 4.1 except for one important modification. Before presenting participants 
with the paradigm we used in Experiment 4.1 we manipulated mental fatigue. Half of 
the participants were asked to perform calculations for one hour (the high mental 
fatigue condition) and the other half of the participants were asked to relax and read 
some magazines for one hour before starting the experiment (the low mental fatigue 
condition). We expected that non-fatigued participants would be slower to recognize 
distracting stimuli compared with control stimuli, but that this effect would disappear 
for the fatigued participants. In addition, we explored (a) the effect of mental fatigue 
on intention execution and (b) the relation between inhibition of distracting cues and 
intention execution. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
Fifty undergraduate students participated in Experiment 5.1 in exchange for course 
credits. 
 
Manipulation of mental fatigue 
Participants were randomly assigned to either a mental fatigue or non-fatigue 
condition. In the mental fatigue condition participants were asked to complete 
moderately difficult calculations (e.g. 17 X 19) for one hour. Participants received a 
sheet with 80 calculations and were requested to write down the answer to each 
calculation. Independent of performance on this task, this sheet was replaced every 15 
minutes with a new sheet of 80 calculations. This procedure was implemented to 
ensure that participants would continue to work hard on these calculations.  
In the relaxation condition participants were asked to relax for one hour in a waiting 
room. Magazines were present so that participants could occupy themselves, but it 
was stressed that they should not engage in cognitive demanding work. Before and 
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after this manipulation a manipulation check was administered to check whether 
participants differed in their degree of mental fatigue. As a manipulation check we 
used the Rating Scale Mental Effort (RSME; Zijlstra, 1993) which consists of seven 
150-point answer scales with verbal anchors (raging from ‘no difficulties at all’ to 
‘extremely difficult’) in which is asked about several aspects of fatigue (e.g., “how 
much difficulties do you have in keeping attention to the task”, “how much 
difficulties do you have in exerting further effort”). So, this RSME was filled out 
twice (i.e. before and after the manipulation). The RSME is generally used as a single 
measure of mental fatigue.  
After this, participants received the same task as in the recognition condition 
in Experiment 4.1. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
First of all, we performed a manipulation check on mental fatigue. As expected, we 
found a reliable interaction between time of measurement (before versus after the 
manipulation) and condition (high versus low mental fatigue condition) on the RSME, 
F(1,48) = 22.1, p < .05, partial η2 = .32. Whereas there was no reliable difference 
between the high (M = 18.03, SD = 10.99) and low (M = 15.98, SD = 10.98) condition 
before the mental fatigue manipulation, F(1,49) < 1, a reliable difference appeared 
after the manipulation, F(1,48) = 22.9, p < .05, partial η2 = .32. Participants in the 
high mental fatigue condition reported to be more fatigued (M = 42.84, SD = 19.93) 
than participants in the low mental fatigue condition (M = 19.75, SD = 13.62).  
Before conducting the analysis on the recognition task, we excluded trials in 
which an erroneous response was obtained (15.3% of the trials) and responses given 
outside the response window (0.3% of the trials).  
Next, we computed a 3(cue type: intention, distracting, control) by 2(mental 
fatigue: low vs. high) ANOVA with repeated measures on the first factor. First of all 
this analysis yielded a marginally reliable main effect of cue type, F(2, 96) = 2.52, p = 
.086. Participants were fastest to recognize intention words (M = 868, SD = 205) and 
slowest to recognize distracting cues (M = 920, SD = 218) with control cues (M = 
887, SD = 209) falling in between. Although this effect is only marginally reliable, the 
pattern of results replicates our earlier research (see Chapter 4). More important, 
Chapter 5 
 
72 
however, this main effect was qualified by the predicted interaction between cue type 
and mental fatigue, F(2, 96) = 3.59, p < .05. Next, we analyzed the simple effects 
between cue types for each mental fatigue condition separately. 
First of all, in the low fatigue group participants were reliable slower to 
respond to distracting cues (M = 925, SD = 179) compared with control cues (M = 
855, SD = 148), F(1, 24) = 6.11, p < .05. This effect is consistent with our hypothesis 
and shows that under low mental fatigue distracting cues were inhibited compared 
with the control cues. Unexpectedly, there was no reliable difference between 
intention cues (M = 898, SD = 214) and distracting cues, F(1, 24) = 1.28, p = .27. This 
result will be discussed below. Finally, the difference between intention cues and 
control cues was also not reliable, F(1, 24) = 2.49, p = .13. 
In contrast, participants in the high mental fatigue condition showed no 
reliable difference between distracting cues (M = 915, SD = 255) and control cues (M 
= 920, SD = 254), F(1, 24) < 1. This result is consistent with our hypothesis, because 
it shows that there is no inhibition of distracting stimuli in the high mental fatigue 
condition. In addition, participants in the high mental fatigue condition were reliably 
faster to recognize intention cues (M = 838, SD = 195) compared with both distracting 
cues and control cues, respective comparisons F(1, 24) = 4.58, p < .05 and F(1, 24) = 
5.74, p < .05. This latter effect was unexpected and will be discussed shortly. 
Additional analyses 
 Next, we examined whether there were differences in performance in the 
intention execution task between the low and high fatigue conditions. However, there 
appeared to be no reliable differences between these conditions in accuracy (M = 
4.8% errors for high and M = 3.7% errors for low mental fatigue participants 
respectively; F < 1) or in intention execution speed (M = 636 ms for high and M = 
679 ms for low mental fatigue participants respectively; F(1,49) = 2.00, p = 0.16). 
Thus, mental fatigue did not directly affect intention execution in this experiment. 
 Then, we explored the relationship between accessibility of the stimuli in the 
recognition task and intention execution. First of all, we computed an inhibition score 
(reaction times distracting cues – reaction times control cues). Subsequently, we 
performed a regression analysis with speed of correct intention execution (i.e. reaction 
times of space bar presses towards the intention cues in the intention execution phase) 
as criterion, and as predictors the inhibition score, mental fatigue (high vs low; coded 
as –1 and 1 respectively), and the interaction between these two predictors. This 
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analysis yielded a marginally reliable interaction between inhibition and mental 
fatigue, β = .30, t(32) = 1.96, p = .056. Subsequently, we computed simple regression 
slopes for each fatigue group separately (see Aiken & West, 1991). These results 
showed a reliable relation between inhibition and intention execution for low fatigue 
participants, β = −.45, t(46) = − 1.70, p < .05 (one-tailed), but not for high fatigue 
participants, β = .16, t(46) = 0.97, p = .34. Consistent with our hypothesis these 
results suggest that distracting cues have a differential impact on intention execution 
as a function of level of fatigue. For participants in the low fatigue condition their 
degree of inhibition is related to intention execution: The more distracting cues are 
inhibited, the faster they are in pressing the space bar in the intention execution phase. 
This result replicates the functional relationship between inhibition and intention 
execution reported in experiments 3.1 and 3.2 (see Chapter 3). The relation between 
inhibition and intention execution is absent for participants in the high mental fatigue 
condition. This is consistent with our theorizing that under high mental fatigue, 
inhibitory processes do no longer operate and hence inhibition is unrelated to 
intention execution. 
The present experiment was designed to show that an inhibitory process is 
active in inhibiting stimuli that may interfere with an intention. We hypothesized that 
when participants cannot use their ability to inhibit distracting information no 
difference in accessibility between control stimuli and distracting stimuli should be 
observed. As expected the results showed that inhibition of distracting stimuli was 
indeed absent in the high mental fatigue condition (where executive control is 
impaired), but not in the low mental fatigue condition. These results are consistent 
with previous research that showed that executive control is hampered after inducing 
mental fatigue (van der Linden et al., 2003). We also obtained evidence that inhibition 
of distracting stimuli was functional in the sense that it facilitated intention execution 
in the low mental fatigue condition. Although this effect was not very strong, it nicely 
replicates the similar relation obtained in Chapter 3. 
We also obtained some unexpected effects in the current experiment. First of 
all, participants in the low mental fatigue condition were not reliably faster in 
recognizing intention cues compared with distracting cues. However, because the 
pattern is in the predicted direction (i.e. participants were slower in recognizing 
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distracting cues compared with intention cues) and is reliable again in Experiment 5.2 
this lack of effect may not be problematic. 
More interesting is the fact that participants in the high fatigue condition were 
faster in recognizing intention cues compared to both distracting cues and control 
cues. It appears as if these participants compensated for the fact that they could not 
inhibit distracting cues by focusing all their attention to the intention cues. This may 
explain why participants in the high fatigue condition performed as successful in the 
intention execution phase as participants in the low fatigue condition. By deploying a 
different strategy participants in the high mental fatigue condition were able to 
perform well even without the ability to inhibit distracting stimuli. The use of 
compensatory mechanisms to uphold task performance under mental fatigue has been 
reported in several other studies (see Hockey, 1997). 
The reasoning outlined above raises the question of why not all participants 
deploy such an intention cue focused strategy. Put differently, what could be the 
advantage of inhibiting distracting cues over exclusively focusing on intention cues? 
Our take on this is that although focusing completely on intention cues may be a 
valuable strategy to use when resources to inhibit information are depleted, it is not a 
flexible strategy. This is the case because when attention is focused very narrow, 
other cues in the environment can no longer be processed effectively. Consequently, a 
strong focus on intention cues may result in a lack of detecting cues that are 
important, but not part of the intention. We think that after intention formation it is 
better to be open to process a wide variety of environmental cues. Of course, one runs 
the risk of getting distracted or confused about what to do while processing a broad 
variety of environmental cues. That is why an inhibitory process is necessary, which 
ensures that intentions can still be executed successfully even in the presence of 
distracting cues. Note that even though this reasoning is speculative, it fits the current 
data well. 
 
 
Experiment 5.2 
 
In Experiment 5.2 we intended to replicate the inhibition of distracting stimuli in a 
recognition task that we observed in Experiments 4.2 and 5.1. More importantly, 
however, we aimed to provide further evidence that the inhibition of distracting 
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stimuli involves an active inhibitory process in the sense that the inhibitory process 
operates as long as an intention is uncompleted, and that this inhibitory process stops 
working after an intention has been fulfilled. In Experiment 5.2 we tested this by 
examining whether inhibition of distracting stimuli would be released after intention 
completion. According to the model of action phases by Kuhl (1987) outlined in 
Chapter 1, the motivational maintenance system (MMS) stops sending activation to 
content of an intention once an intention is completed or abandoned. Consistent with 
this idea research has shown that, upon intention completion, intentional content is no 
longer in a heightened state of activation in memory (Marsh, Hicks, & Bink, 1998; 
see also Förster. Liberman, & Higgins, 2005). Complementary to these findings, we 
expected that in the absence of this special status of intentional information, inhibition 
of distracting stimuli would no longer occur. Once the MMS ceases to send activation 
to intentional content, information that was previously a potential source of distraction 
no longer is, because there is nothing to interfere with. Without causing interference 
with an intention, these previously distracting stimuli will require no inhibition and, as 
a result, accessibility of distracting stimuli concerning such a completed intention will 
return to baseline level. To test this theory, participants in Experiment 5.2 received the 
same task as in the recognition task condition of Experiment 4.1 with one 
modification. Participants received the recognition task either before or after intention 
completion. We hypothesized inhibition of distracting stimuli compared with control 
stimuli, before, but not after intention completion. 
 
Method 
 
Participants and design 
Eighty-one undergraduate students participated in Experiment 5.2 in exchange for €2 
(approximately $2.40). The design is a 3(stimulus type: intention, distracting, control) 
by 2(intention status: completed vs. uncompleted) mixed design with repeated 
measures on the first factor. 
 
Materials 
The stimuli used in Experiment 5.2 are identical to those used in Experiment 4.1. 
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Procedure 
The procedure in both intention status conditions of Experiment 5.2 (completed vs. 
uncompleted) was identical to the procedure of the recognition task condition of 
Experiment 4.1 except for one important change in each condition. See Figure 5.1 for 
an outline of the experimental procedure per condition. Participants in the completed 
intention condition received the intention execution task directly following intention 
formation and before the recognition task. This way the recognition task would 
measure accessibility of intention, distracting and control stimuli after intention 
completion. After the recognition task participants in the completed intention 
condition were thanked and paid for their participation. 
After intention formation participants in the uncompleted intention condition 
received the first task of the experiment for the second time. So, they were again 
asked to press the space bar in response to all fruits, animals and professions. This 
second presentation ensured that exposure to all stimuli in the recognition task in this 
condition is comparable with exposure of the stimuli in the recognition task in the 
completed intention condition (in both conditions all intention stimuli have been 
encountered three times (including intention formation) and distracting and control 
stimuli twice before the recognition task). Finally, following the recognition task 
participants in the uncompleted intention condition were presented with the intention 
execution task that required them to press the space bar in response to specific 
exemplars for which they previously formed an intention. After that participants in 
this condition were thanked and paid for their participation. 
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      Completed condition        Uncompleted condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Outline of experimental procedures of the completed intention 
condition and the uncompleted intention condition of 
Experiment 5.2. 
 
Results and discussion1 
 
Three participants were excluded from the following analyses. One participant 
responded erroneously in more than 75 % of the trials. After excluding this 
participant, two additional participants were excluded because they responded 
erroneously in more than 33% of the trials (which was, just as in Experiment 4.1, 
more than three standard deviations above the mean error rate). Next, we excluded 
trials in which a response was incorrect (9.0 % of responses in the completed 
intention condition and 11.1 % of responses in the uncompleted intention condition) 
and trials in which response latencies exceeded the window limit (0.3% and 0.2% for 
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the completed and uncompleted intention conditions respectively). Analyses were 
performed on log-transformed data, but we report non-transformed means. 
To test whether status of an intention (completed vs. uncompleted) would 
differently affect inhibition of distracting stimuli we performed a stimulus type 
(intention, distracting, control) by intention status (completed vs. uncompleted) mixed 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with repeated measures on the first factor. The means 
are shown in Figure 5.2. First of all a main effect of stimulus type appeared. Overall 
participants were fastest to indicate that an intention stimulus was presented before (M 
= 710, SD = 140) and slowest to indicate that a distracting stimulus was presented 
before (M = 754, SD = 167) with recognition latencies towards control stimuli in 
between (M = 737, SD =169), F(2, 152) = 5.53, partial η2 = .07, p < .05. However, 
this effect was qualified by a reliable interaction with intention status, F(2, 152) = 
3.93, partial η2 = .05, p < .05.  
Figure 5.2.  Recognition time latencies as a function of intention status and 
the type of stimulus in Experiment 5.2. 
 
To test whether uncompleted intentions caused inhibition of distracting stimuli (right 
half of Figure 5.2), we performed simple effect tests between stimulus types within 
the uncompleted intention condition. These tests revealed increased reaction times to 
distracting stimuli (M = 756 ms, SD = 177) compared with both intention stimuli (M = 
707 ms, SD = 119) and control stimuli (M = 705 ms, SD = 119), respective 
comparisons F(1, 37) = 4.73, partial η2 = .11, p < .05 and F(1, 37) = 4.17, partial η2 = 
.10, p < .05. This latter reliable contrast between control and distracting stimuli shows 
that intention formation causes inhibition of distracting stimuli. There was no reliable 
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difference between intention and control stimuli, F(1, 37) < 1. This pattern of results 
is a replication of the recognition task condition of Experiment 4.1 and consistent with 
our hypothesis in showing that stimuli that are related to an intention are indeed 
inhibited. 
Next, we examined simple effects of stimulus types in the intention 
completion condition (left side of Figure 5.2). As predicted, there was no reliable 
difference between the distracting (M = 752 ms, SD = 160) and control stimuli (M = 
768 ms, SD = 203), F(1, 39) = 1.1, partial η2 = .03, p = .30. This pattern of results is 
consistent with our hypothesis that inhibition of distracting stimuli is faded out when 
an intention is completed.  
Furthermore, simple effect tests further revealed decreased reaction times to 
intention stimuli (M = 712 ms, SD = 118) compared with both distracting stimuli and 
control stimuli, respective comparisons F(1, 39) = 8.28, partial η2 = .18 p < .05 and 
F(1, 39) = 14.86, partial η2 = .28, p < .05. We think that in our paradigm the 
facilitation effect merely shows improved memory for behavior that has been 
performed. Consistent with this interpretation, research in the domain of the 
enactment effect has repeatedly shown enhanced memory for previously performed 
behaviors compared with other studied behaviors (e.g. Koriat & Pearlman-Avnion, 
2003). 
The results of Experiment 5.2 are consistent with a functional perspective on 
inhibition of distracting stimuli: As long as an intention must be kept active, 
distracting stimuli require inhibition. However, once an intention is completed, there 
is no longer a need for shielding this intention from distraction, and hence inhibition 
of distracting stimuli is cancelled. As such, these results are complementary with 
previous research that showed absence of a special status of completed intentions 
(Marsh, Hicks, & Bink, 1998) 2. Moreover, the findings support our claim that the 
inhibitory process that targets distracting stimuli is indeed an active process, because 
it operates as long as it is needed. 
 
General Discussion 
 
In two experiments we have sought support for the idea that inhibition of distracting 
stimuli after intention formation (see Chapter 4) is the result of an active inhibitory 
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process. As outlined in the introduction, assessing whether an active inhibitory 
process is at work is by no means a straightforward issue. This is the case because an 
active inhibitory process is difficult to observe directly and the outcome of an active 
inhibitory process can often be accounted for by other mechanisms. Therefore, we 
used two moderators to examine this issue.  
The first moderator, mental fatigue, is known to affect executive control 
processes (van der Linden et al., 2003). As inhibitory processes can be viewed as part 
of executive control it was hypothesized that diminishing the ability to use executive 
control, by inducing mental fatigue, would reduce inhibition of distracting stimuli. 
This is what we tested in Experiment 5.1. The results of this experiment indeed 
showed that after inducing mental fatigue inhibition of distracting stimuli 
disappeared, whereas inhibition of distracting stimuli was found for those participants 
who were non-fatigued. Thus, the ability to draw upon executive control processes is 
a pre-requisite for inhibiting distracting stimuli. As such, inhibition of distracting 
stimuli can be viewed as an active inhibitory process.  
We also obtained some evidence that, for the non-fatigued participants, 
inhibition was related to successful intention execution. That is, the more participants 
inhibited distracting stimuli, the faster they were in reacting to intention cues in the 
intention execution task. These results lend support to our theorizing that intentions 
are shielded from distraction by an inhibitory mechanism that actively targets 
distracting stimuli to prevent interference with an online intention. 
 In a second experiment we focused on a second moderator to assess whether 
inhibition of distracting stimuli involves an active inhibitory process. Particularly, in 
Experiment 5.2 we examined whether inhibition of distracting stimuli would 
disappear once the intention is completed. As expected we found that once an 
intention is completed inhibition of distracting stimuli is released. This result supports 
the idea that the inhibition of distracting stimuli is set in place to shield an online (i.e. 
uncompleted) intention from interference. This finding provides strong support for the 
idea that the inhibition of distracting stimuli is an active process. Consequently, any 
explanation that assumes that inhibition of distracting stimuli is a by-product of some 
sort would have to account for the fact that the inhibition disappears after intention 
completion. 
 So, although the experiments reported in this chapter seem quite different on 
the surface, they support a common proposition: Intentions are shielded from 
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distraction by an active inhibitory process that requires resources and operates until an 
intention is completed. 
  
Endnotes 
 
1. Results of this intention execution phase are not reported because we observed no 
reliable differences in performance on this intention execution task between the 
between-subjects conditions or in the relation between the recognition task and the 
intention execution task. 
2. Because we used new exemplars of the experimental categories (fruits, animals and 
professions) as filler words we could compare reaction latencies to new exemplars 
from the category of intention stimuli (i.e. new distracting stimuli) with new 
exemplars from the category of control stimuli (i.e. new control stimuli). To enhance 
power, we tested this difference in a collapsed data set of the recognition task 
condition of Experiment 4.1 and the uncompleted intention condition of Experiment 
5.2. We found no effect of stimulus type (new distracting vs. new control), F < 1. This 
result suggests that stimuli that are merely semantically (and not episodically) related 
to an active intention receive no inhibition (see also Perfect et al. 2002). However, 
because our design was not ideal to test this hypothesis and responding to new stimuli 
is qualitatively different from responding to old stimuli, future research is necessary 
to arrive at definite conclusions on this issue. 
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Chapter 6 
 
General Discussion 
 
 
In this dissertation we set out to examine how people succeed in maintaining an 
intention accurately in memory when the possibility of confusion is near. In order to 
reach this goal we started out by studying inhibitory processes in retrospective long-
term memory. Next, we related this knowledge to goal-directed behavior, and 
explored whether the representation of intentions in memory would be aided by a 
similar mechanism. In this final chapter we will review the empirical findings 
obtained in chapters 2 to 5 and discuss how the findings shed new light on the relation 
between memory and behavior in view of the existing literature. After discussing and 
summarizing the main findings of the empirical chapters, some limitations will 
addressed, and questions for future research will be raised. 
 
An Inhibitory Process Operating in Long-Term Memory 
 
Many studies have shown that repeated retrieval of specific information in long-term 
memory can cause forgetting of related (i.e. distracting) information (e.g. Anderson, 
Bjork, & Bjork, 1994; Anderson & Spellman, 1995; Aslan, Bäuml, & Pastötter, in 
press; Bäuml. Zellner, & Vilimak, 2005; Blaxton & Neely, 1983; Camp, Pecher. & 
Schimdt, 2005; Dunn & Spellman, 2003; Gomez-Ariza, Lechuga, Pelegrina, & Bajo, 
2005; MacLeod & Saunders, 2005; Macrae & MacLeod, 1999; Saunders & MacLeod, 
2002; Perfect et al., 2004). In the literature there is continuing debate about whether 
this forgetting is caused by an inhibitory process (e.g. Anderson & Spellman, 1995; 
Johansson, Aslan, Bäuml, Gäbel, Mecklinger, in press; Perfect, Moulin, Conway, & 
Perry, 2002; Gomez-Arizia et al., 2005; Dodd, Castel, & Roberts, 2006). In Chapter 2 
we have tried to shed light on this issue by addressing two (related) problems that, in 
our opinion, lie at the heart of this debate. We will now first discuss these problems 
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and subsequently detail how we addressed them. Note that as the inhibitory 
explanation of retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF) forms a basis for our theorizing in 
this dissertation, we will elaborate on it somewhat extensively. 
 
Non-inhibitory explanations of retrieval-induced forgetting 
Most studies cited above have relied on (cued-) recall as a dependent measure to 
assess whether RIF involves an inhibitory process. Evidence for the involvement of 
an inhibitory process during retrieval is in these experiments obtained when 
distracting stimuli are forgotten compared to control stimuli. This forgetting is 
assumed to be the result of an inhibitory state of the distracting stimuli. However, on 
the basis of recall impairment alone it is impossible to establish with certainty that a 
memory representation is in a reduced level of activation (i.e. inhibited). There are 
several problems concerning this issue that ensue from using recall as a dependent 
measure. For instance, it could very well be that participants, once they retrieve a 
particular distracting stimulus, are not sure that they have seen it and hence become 
hesitant to report such a stimulus. In this case the distracting stimulus is forgotten nor 
inhibited, but simply not reported. Furthermore, performance on (cued-) recall relies 
heavily on the memory search strategy of participants. One particularly important 
aspect is the choice of when to terminate search for specific exemplars. Maybe 
performance on recall of distracting stimuli would increase when participants are 
encouraged to search for a longer period of time. 
But even when participants report every stimulus they can think of and 
perform a perfect memory search there are problems with recall as an estimate for an 
inhibitory state of a stimulus. In fact there is a whole class of models called 
associative bias models (Anderson & Bjork, 1994) that can account for RIF without 
assuming an inhibitory process. These explanations include occlusion (i.e. repeatedly 
retrieved exemplars seize control of a limited capacity response production 
mechanism so that distracting stimuli cannot reach the threshold that is necessary for 
production), resource diffusion (i.e. repeatedly retrieved exemplars rob other 
exemplars within the same semantic category from activation), or associative 
decrement (the link between a distracting stimulus and a semantic category decreases 
during retrieval practice, because the distracting stimulus is sometimes erroneously 
retrieved; see Anderson & Bjork, 1994 or Anderson & Spelllman, 1995, for more 
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details). All these explanations are non-inhibitory in nature and can account for the 
fact that distracting stimuli are forgotten without assuming any inhibitory process. 
Finally, cued recall is problematic as a dependent variable, because the 
retrieval cue might be subject to meaning bias (Anderon & Spellman, 1995). For 
instance, suppose that participants studied strawberry, pear, lemon and orange as part 
of a list of fruits. After repeatedly retrieving orange and lemon through retrieval 
practice (e.g. FRUIT-or… FRUIT-le…) the meaning of the category fruits might be 
biased in the direction of citrus fruits. Consequently, it will be harder to retrieve pear 
and strawberry upon presentation of the cue fruit. Thus, repeatedly retrieving specific 
exemplars in the retrieval-practice phase can bias the meaning of the retrieval cue 
(e.g. fruit) in the cued recall phase which causes recall impairment of not retrieved 
exemplars of that category (i.e. distracting stimuli). Note that this explanation again 
explains forgetting of distracting stimuli without resorting to an inhibitory process. 
There is some previous research that aimed to get around the problems 
discussed above. Anderson and Spellman (1995) adapted the retrieval-practice 
paradigm so that many of the problems raised above were no longer applicable. 
However, because they used cued-recall as a dependent variable report bias (e.g. 
unwillingness to report specific stimuli) cannot be ruled out. Others that have used 
other dependent measures than (cued-) recall either did not find reduced accessibility 
of distracting stimuli (Butler, Williams, Zacks, & Maki, 2001) or found it on tasks 
were some of the discussed alternative explanations still hold (Perfect et al., 2002). 
So, the second problem is that those studies that used other dependent measures than 
(cued-) recall to circumvent the problems discussed above, have often failed to show 
any inhibition of distracting stimuli. 
 
Assessing an inhibitory account of retrieval-induced forgetting 
In chapter 2 we aimed to shed light on this issue by examining whether information 
that is related to previously retrieved information (i.e. distracting information) is not 
only forgotten, but also slower recognized in a recognition task and slower recognized 
as a word in a lexical decision task. As discussed in more detail below, such results 
would provide direct evidence for the idea that RIF (Anderson et al., 1994) involves 
an inhibitory process. 
In Experiment 2.1 we employed the standard retrieval-induced forgetting 
paradigm with one important modification: Instead of using (cued-) recall as a 
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dependent measure we presented participants with a speeded recognition task. The 
results showed that participants were slower to recognize distracting stimuli (i.e. RP- 
items) than both control items (NRP items) and previously retrieved items (RP+ 
items). In Experiment 2.2 we used a lexical decision task as a dependent variable and 
found that distracting stimuli were slower identified as words than both previously 
retrieved stimuli and control stimuli. Experiment 2.2 is the first study that shows that 
inhibition of distracting stimuli in a RIF paradigm can be found on an implicit 
measure of memory. Together, Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 support the idea that 
distracting stimuli are inhibited as a result of repeatedly retrieving specific memory 
representations.  
Although there are some previous studies that arrived at this conclusion the 
present results constitute more direct evidence. Particularly, using a reaction time task 
instead of a (cued-) recall task circumvents most problems with concluding that 
distracting stimuli are inhibited. First of all, by presenting participants with the stimuli 
in a reaction time task, non-inhibitory explanations for the increased reaction time 
latencies of distracting stimuli such as report bias or search termination are not much 
of an issue. In addition, because the stimuli were presented without their semantic 
category labels as cues, alternative explanations based on meaning bias or associative 
bias models are ruled out. More specifically, by tapping the activation level of 
individual stimuli directly (and without a category label present), explanations that 
assume that (a) response production of distracting stimuli is blocked (i.e. occlusion), 
(b) the effect is caused by uneven distribution of activation within a category 
(resource diffusion), or (c) biased relations develop between a category and 
distracting stimulus (i.e. associative decrement) are excluded. This latter argument is 
mainly applicable to Experiment 2.2 where the use of categories (to aid responses) is 
highly unlikely. So, because reaction times are a more direct way of measuring level 
of activation in long-term memory than recall we ruled out alternative explanations 
and supported the inhibitory account of RIF. 
The results from Chapter 2 are consistent with recent developments in the area 
of RIF that further support the idea that retrieval of information from memory 
involves an inhibitory process. For instance, recent research by Johansson et al. (in 
press) has shown that activity in the prefrontal cortex during retrieval of specific 
memory representations is related to forgetting of related memory representations. As 
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prefrontal regions are assumed to underlie inhibitory control this research is consistent 
with the inhibitory control account of RIF. 
 The aim of Chapter 2 was to provide unambiguous evidence that RIF involves 
an inhibitory process. As outlined above, on the basis of Chapter 2 we think we can 
safely conclude that RIF involves an inhibitory process that targets distracting stimuli. 
We deemed this imperative because the RIF paradigm forms the basis of the 
experiments we developed in Chapters 3 to 5. By zooming in on the process that 
underlies RIF, our theorizing and reasoning concerning the status of distracting 
stimuli in the case of intentional behavior was greatly facilitated. We will now relate 
the knowledge obtained in Chapter 2 to the area of goal-directed behavior. 
 
Shielding intentions 
 
In chapters 3 to 5 we developed a new paradigm, based on the RIF paradigm, to 
examine whether forming an intention would lead to inhibition of distracting stimuli. 
Instead of asking participants to retrieve specific exemplars from long-term memory, 
we instructed them to form an intention to press the space bar when specific 
exemplars appeared in a subsequent task. Similar to the experiments reported in 
Chapter 2 this manipulation created three types of exemplars: intention stimuli 
(comparable with retrieval-practiced exemplars in Chapter 2), distracting stimuli and 
control stimuli. In all experiments reported in Chapters 3 to 5 we measured the 
accessibility of the content of intentions, the execution of the previously formed 
intentions, as well as relations between these two variables. In this section we will 
focus on results related to the accessibility of content of intentions in long-term 
memory and we will discuss the relation between accessibility and the execution 
component of intentions in the next section.    
In Experiments 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 5.1 and 5.2 we obtained repeated evidence that 
forming an intention leads to increased reaction times to identify distracting stimuli as 
words (Experiments 3.1 and 3.2) or to identify them as part of a previously presented 
list of stimuli (Experiments 4.1 and 5.2) compared control stimuli. Although the 
finding that distracting stimuli received increased reaction latencies in both a lexical 
decision task and a recognition task gives the impression of being consistent with 
results from Chapter 2, Experiment 4.1 revealed that this is not the case. In this 
experiment we showed that when the measurement of accessibility of intention 
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relevant material is separated from the intention execution phase we obtained 
increased reaction times towards distracting stimuli in a recognition task only. How 
can we account for this seeming inconsistency? 
There are actually two types of explanations that can account for the 
discrepancy between Chapter 2 and Chapter 4, namely conceptual explanations 
(which are theoretically interesting) and methodological explanations. A theoretically 
uninteresting explanation would be to state that the absence of an effect in the lexical 
decision task in Experiment 4.1 is due to methodological factors. Maybe the lexical 
decision task was not sensitive enough to detect any differences in accessibility. 
However, we think that such an explanation is not plausible, because we have found 
differences in accessibility between item types using a lexical decision task with 
similar materials and a related procedure in Experiment 2.2. For that reason, we think 
it is unlikely that the explanation for the absence of an effect is methodological in 
nature. 
Another explanation would be that the inhibition of distracting stimuli induced 
by intention formation is qualitatively different from inhibition of distracting stimuli 
after retrieval practice. As argued in Chapter 4, we think that such an explanation 
could indeed account for the results. To repeat the conclusion reached in Chapter 4, 
we think that increased reaction times concerning distracting stimuli after intention 
formation in a recognition task only, is an indication that these stimuli are inhibited in 
episodic rather than semantic memory. Note that this explanation leads to a 
reinterpretation of the data of Chapter 3. Although the data showed increased lexical 
decision latencies towards distracting stimuli, we now view these increased reaction 
latencies as an indication that they were slower identified as previously presented 
episodic representations.  
An important question that arises from the discrepancy between the status of 
distracting stimuli in RIF versus the status of distracting stimuli after intention 
formation is whether an inhibitory explanation as offered for RIF is still as good an 
explanation for the increased reaction times concerning distracting stimuli after 
intention formation. As argued in Chapter 2, strictly speaking, increased recognition 
latencies can be explained without resorting to an inhibitory process. That is, it could 
be that upon presentation of a distracting stimulus (e.g. grape), participants activate 
the semantic category of that stimulus (i.e. fruit) to aid them in their decision whether 
they have seen this stimulus. By using the category as a means in determining 
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whether they have seen a stimulus before, non-inhibitory explanations as discussed 
above (e.g. meaning bias or resource diffusion) become applicable again. Whereas we 
ruled out these explanations in Chapter 2 in Experiment 2.2 (accessing semantic 
categories seems irrelevant with respect to lexical decisions), they appear relevant 
again to explain increased reaction times towards distracting stimuli induced by 
intention formation as we found this effect only in a recognition task. 
We think there are three findings in our research, which rule out category-
based non-inhibitory explanations of our results. First of all, in Experiment 5.1 we 
showed that the inhibition of distracting stimuli effect disappears when participants 
are mentally fatigued. Because mental fatigue is related to the ability to inhibit 
distracting information, this moderation supports the idea that an inhibitory process 
targets the status of distracting stimuli in memory. This moderation would not be 
expected by category based non-inhibitory explanations. For instance, it is hard to see 
why resource diffusion (e.g. within the category fruit intention cues apple and pear 
rob grape and cherry from activation) would be moderated by mental fatigue.  
A similar logic applies to the moderation of inhibition of distracting stimuli by 
status of the intention (i.e. completed versus uncompleted). That is, it is hard to see 
how an explanation that assumes that inhibition of distracting stimuli is a by-product 
of presenting an intention cue can account for the fact that this inhibition disappears 
after intention completion. This finding, however, is consistent with an active 
inhibitory account. The final finding that excludes non-inhibitory explanations is the 
fact that increased reaction time latencies towards distracting stimuli are related to 
speed of intention execution. This issue will be discussed more extensively in the 
following section. 
 
On the Relation between Memory and Goal-Directed Behavior 
 
Throughout our theorizing we have argued that inhibition of distracting stimuli could 
be functional in that it facilitates goal-directed behavior. Unlike previous research that 
focused on either the status of intentional content in memory (i.e. content; e.g. 
Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; Zeigarnik, 1927) or the execution of an intention (i.e. intent; 
e.g. McDaniel & Einstein, 1993; Marsh, Hicks, & Watson, 2002) we employed a 
paradigm that measured both content and intent. This allowed us to examine whether 
the status of distracting stimuli in memory was indeed related to intentional behavior. 
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 Consistent with our theorizing, in Experiments 3.1, 3.2 and 5.1 we found 
evidence that the status of distracting stimuli in memory was related to intentional 
behavior: Inhibition of distracting stimuli compared with control stimuli was 
positively related to speed of intention execution. In Experiments 3.1 and 3.2 we 
found this relationship across all participants and in Experiment 5.1 we showed that 
this relation was moderated by mental fatigue. Only those participants that did not 
receive a mental fatigue treatment, and hence could rely on their inhibitory control 
mechanisms, showed this relationship. Both the relation between the status of 
distracting stimuli in memory and intentional behavior on the one hand and its 
moderation thorough mental fatigue on the other hand are important with respect to an 
inhibitory account of dealing with distraction of intentions. All non-inhibitory 
explanations, described earlier, that could account for slower responses to distracting 
stimuli treat the slower responses as a by-product of some sort. Therefore, none of 
these explanations would predict any relation between the status of distracting 
memory representations and intentional behavior, led alone moderation through 
mental fatigue. Only explanations that see the status of distracting stimuli as 
important predict this relation. Consequently, we argue that the most parsimonious 
explanation to account for the present findings is to state that an inhibitory mechanism 
actively targets distracting stimuli in order to prevent interference with the content of 
intentions.  
 The relation between memory for distracting stimuli and intentional behavior 
was absent in Experiments 4.1 and 5.2. We think that the absence of this relation is 
caused by the fact that the relation is moderated by several factors that act on 
executive control. In Experiments 3.1 and 3.2 we used many participants and found a 
rather weak relationship between the status of distracting stimuli and intentional 
behavior. We think that this relation was weak, because this sample included 
participants that varied in their ability to use executive control. For instance, some 
participants may have been mentally fatigued, because they just finished an exam or 
attended a lecture. Furthermore, in Experiment 5.2 we found a (stronger) relationship 
only after having identified a moderator: Mental fatigue. It is important to note that in 
Experiment 5.2 the non-fatigued participants were asked to relax for one our before 
starting the experiment. The fact that we controlled mental fatigue in this experiment 
may clarify why we did obtain a relation for this group of participants, but not in the 
recognition task condition of Experiment 4.1 and the uncompleted intention condition 
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of Experiment 5.2. Future research may identify other moderators (e.g. individual 
differences in working memory capacity) that can strengthen the relation between 
inhibition of distracting stimuli and behavior. These observations (i.e. many 
participants are needed or a moderator needs to be identified in order to find the 
functional relationship) may explain the absence of the functional relationship in 
Experiments 4.1 and 5.2. 
 In summary, we think that by treating the experiments reported in Chapters 3 
to 5 as a package, we have provided convincing evidence that forming an intention 
induces inhibition of distracting stimuli. 
 
Some Strengths and Weaknesses of the Current Research 
 
Having established this conclusion it is now time to discuss some strengths and 
weaknesses of the reported research. An important feature of the current research is 
that we used the same kind of stimuli throughout our experiments. These stimuli were 
exemplars of semantic categories that were reported by Storms (2001). Although, in 
different chapters, we used a variety of exemplars from this sample, the nature of the 
stimuli was always the same, that is, concrete exemplars that were highly associated 
with specific semantic categories. We deliberately opted for this approach, because it 
enabled us to modify an existing paradigm (the retrieval-induced forgetting paradigm) 
into a paradigm that was suitable to test the maintenance of intentions in memory in 
challenging situations. This way we could operationalize distracting stimuli in line 
with existing literature on this subject. Furthermore, it allowed us to fall back on 
research and theorizing on retrieval-induced forgetting to assess an inhibitory account 
of the shielding of intentions. Finally, an advantage of using the same kind of stimuli 
throughout our research is that it makes comparisons and relations between chapters 
clear, and allowed us to check the replicability of the effect. 
 A drawback of using only one kind of stimulus is that it hampers 
generalization to other research and embedding of the present research in previous 
research on the representation of intentions in memory in particular. Because the 
present paradigm is primarily based on research concerning retrieval-induced 
forgetting (e.g. Anderson et al., 1994), and not so much on research concerning the 
maintenance of intentions in memory (e.g. Goschke & Kuhl, 1993), it remains 
difficult to directly compare research in this dissertation with existing literature on 
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intention memory. This is unfortunate as the present findings may have interesting 
implications for research on intention memory. For instance, it suggests an answer to 
a question raised by Goschke and Kuhl (1993) in their article on intention superiority: 
Are intentions in a heightened state of activation or are distracting memory 
representations in a lowered state of activation in long-term memory? Their results 
were inconclusive on this issue as they compared only two stimuli: an intention 
relevant script versus a to be remembered script. Note that it is unclear whether the to 
be remembered script should be interpreted as a control script or a distracting script. 
Our results, that included an accessibility measure of control stimuli, favor an 
inhibitory explanation over a facilitory one. In spite of this, the present stimuli and 
paradigm differ in important ways from the paradigm by Goschke and Kuhl (1993) so 
that definite conclusions cannot be drawn. 
A second problem with the use of the present paradigm with only one kind of 
stimulus is that it limits generalization to everyday life. In daily life most (if not all) 
people do not form intentions to press buttons upon encountering lions or strawberries 
regularly. This observation goes to show that it is not instantly evident how the 
present research can be applied to daily life. Nevertheless, we think that even though 
there is no one to one mapping of the findings in this dissertation to normally formed 
intentions, the intentions formed by the participants may not differ much conceptually 
from many intentions formed outside the laboratory. In real life, forming an intention 
to react to a set of stimuli in the presence of similar (i.e. distracting) stimuli is 
common. Examples of real life intentions that resemble those in our experiments 
include remembering to buy some specific groceries when we get to a shopping 
center, remembering a few names to send an e-mail to, or keeping some drinks in 
mind to serve to guests at a party. We think it is not a great stretch to propose that in 
these examples the same kind of process is operating as we have examined. Even so, 
we did not test this assumption. 
A final limitation as a result of the restricted use of stimuli is that we have 
only examined one kind of distraction: Content that is semantically related to an 
intention. We like to point this out, because we think that the processes described to 
account for our findings need not be constrained to semantic distraction. 
Theoretically, we think any kind of stimulus that could interfere with an intention is 
targeted by distraction. These may include other intentions, attractive environmental 
stimuli, and etcetera. Of course, this conjecture goes well beyond the data given. 
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Directions for Future Research 
 
In this section we would like raise some avenues for future scientific inquiry that 
emanate from the issues raised above, as well as offer new ones that we think are 
appealing to pursue. First of all, as described in the previous section, we think it is 
important to use stimuli other than exemplars of semantic categories. In particular, it 
would be interesting to merge the paradigm by Goschke and Kuhl (1993) with the 
current paradigm by using three kinds of action scripts: an intentional script, a 
distracting script and a control script. Such an approach may provide insight in the 
question of whether the intention superiority effect is really an inhibition of 
distracting stimuli effect. 
 Furthermore, we think it is important for future research to put more emphasis 
on the relation between long-term memory and behavior. Traditionally, most 
investigators in these domains have studied these processes independently. Our 
research shows that there are fascinating interrelations between these areas that are 
valuable to expand on. In doing so it would be interesting to identify additional 
moderators that bring this relation further to the surface. Likely candidates for the 
moderation of this relationship are variables that influence the ability to inhibit 
information such as working memory capacity, or individual differences in age or 
impulsivity. 
Another important question concerns the nature of distraction. Throughout our 
theorizing we have treated stimuli that are semantically related to intentions as 
distracting. We have argued that this semantic relatedness causes these stimuli to be a 
potential source of interference towards the content of intentions. This potential to 
interfere could lead to forgetting of intentions, hence the term distracting stimuli. This 
assumption still awaits empirical support however. A problem with testing this idea is 
that we think that the stimulus is inhibited before it actually interferes. So, in order to 
test this assumption it is necessary to be very specific about what it is that makes 
stimuli distracting or potentially interfering. 
Related to this issue is the question of the timing of the inhibition of 
distracting stimuli. Specifically, are distracting stimuli spontaneously inhibited 
directly after forming an intention, or are the distracting stimuli inhibited upon 
encountering them in a later stage? As argued in Chapter 4, we prefer the former 
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explanation. Nonetheless, it is a challenge for future research to show this 
unambiguously. One way to examine this would be to measure the level of inhibitory 
control (operationalized as activation of the dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex) during 
and after intention formation and compare this with the level of inhibitory control 
during encountering the distracting stimuli in the recognition task or intention 
execution task. If, as we think, inhibitory control operates directly after intention 
formation, the level of inhibitory control immediately after or during intention 
formation should be the better predictor. We think this is a very important issue for 
future study.  
 Finally, we think it would be worthwhile to examine whether the special status 
of distracting stimuli could be found on another measure than recognition latencies. 
Particularly, if distracting stimuli are inhibited to prevent them from guiding behavior 
it can be assumed that inhibition directed at distracting stimuli is not constrained to a 
cognitive reduction in level of activation. As behavior is for a large part guided by 
evaluative processes (i.e. positive evaluations trigger approach and negative 
evaluations avoidance behavior; e.g. Strack & Deutsch, 2004) it might be the case that 
there are also evaluative consequences of inhibiting a distracting stimulus. As argued 
more comprehensively elsewhere (Veling, Holland, & van Knippenberg, 2006; 2007), 
it would be rather functional that distracting stimuli are devalued as a result of their 
potential to interfere with goal-directed behavior. This way they would not trigger 
behavior as easily as intentional stimuli.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this dissertation we intended to examine the micro-cognitive processes that form 
the basis for successful intention execution. To reach this goal we combined insights 
from two research traditions: Research on retrieval-induced forgetting and research on 
intention memory. We merged features from experiments of both these traditions in a 
new paradigm and found that inhibitory processes operate after intention formation to 
shield intentions from distraction. In closing, we would like to emphasize that 
although the experiments reported in this dissertation were designed to study 
theoretical assumptions they may not be far away from everyday life experience. 
Executing previously formed intentions in demanding situations effectively is an 
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ability that is indispensable for human functioning. Without it human behavior would 
be stimulus-response-like, dependent on cues in the immediate environment. By 
elucidating processes that contribute to flexible behavior we hope to have broadened 
our understanding of the mechanisms responsible for complex human behavior. 
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Summary
 
 
The ability to form an intention that can be executed later provides human behavior 
with a great deal of flexibility. In fact, this ability is so ubiquitous in everyday life that 
its absence seems unimaginable. Intentions are formed to buy a ticket for the Rolling 
Stones, get some books from the library, invite people for a party, or buy some 
groceries at the shopping centre. Although these intentions are successfully executed 
most of the time, this is not always the case. Sometimes we may forget an intention 
altogether or become confused about its exact content. This is not very surprising 
considering that there is usually a lot of information that may distract us from our 
previously formed intentions. For instance, after forming an intention to buy specific 
groceries for the weekend there is a risk that we confuse some of them with the 
groceries that we intended to buy last week, so that we may end up with groceries we 
do not need. Nonetheless, generally many people seem successful in the correct 
execution of their intentions. The current thesis is concerned with the question of how 
people manage to maintain an accurate representation of intentions in memory 
especially in situations were distracting stimuli are abundant. 
 To examine this question we have focused on the representation of intention 
relevant information and distracting information in long-term memory. More 
specifically, we studied the status of distracting stimuli in long-term memory after the 
formation of an intention. We hypothesized that distracting stimuli would be inhibited 
compared to neutral stimuli once an intention is formed. This inhibited state of 
distracting stimuli could be functional to prevent interference of these stimuli with the 
content of the intention, and thus aid successful intention execution.  
We examined this idea in two steps. First of all, we examined the status of 
distracting stimuli in the domain of retrieval-induced forgetting. The rationale behind 
this was twofold. First of all, we sought to provide clear evidence that inhibitory 
processes that target distracting information in long-term memory exist. Because the 
retrieval-induced forgetting paradigm is robust we choose this paradigm to obtain 
such evidence. Furthermore, it provided us with a clear operationalization of 
distracting stimuli that we could use throughout this dissertation. In the second step 
the retrieval-induced forgetting paradigm provided us with a springboard to develop 
Summary 
 
106 
experiments (with a modified paradigm) to study inhibition of distracting stimuli after 
intention formation. 
So, in Chapter 2 we conducted two experiments that examined whether 
retrieval of information from long-term memory can cause inhibition of distracting 
information by using the retrieval-induced forgetting paradigm. In this paradigm 
participants were asked to memorize exemplars from two or more semantic 
categories. Next, they were instructed to retrieve a selection of these exemplars by 
means of word stem completion. Subsequently, we measured accessibility of the 
retrieved exemplars, exemplars that are semantically related to the retrieved 
exemplars (i.e. distracting stimuli) and unrelated exemplars (i.e. control exemplars) by 
means of a recognition task (Experiment 2.1) and a lexical decision task (Experiment 
2.2). Note that all stimuli were memorized in the first phase.  
In Experiment 2.1 we showed that repeated retrieval of exemplars from a 
category resulted in longer recognition latencies of non-retrieved exemplars from that 
same category, compared to recognition latencies of control exemplars. In Experiment 
2.2 we obtained the same pattern of results using a lexical decision task. This is the 
first time that retrieval-induced forgetting was demonstrated on an implicit test of 
memory. Whereas previous research has mostly relied on recall as a dependent 
measure to assess whether retrieval of information from memory causes inhibition of 
distracting information, we showed this inhibition in a more direct manner. This way 
we rule out some non-inhibitory explanations of this effect and conclude that 
inhibitory processes exist in long-term memory that target distracting information. 
 In Chapter 3 we modified the retrieval-induced forgetting paradigm so that we 
could examine whether merely forming an intention was sufficient to induce 
inhibition of distracting stimuli. Again we asked participants to memorize exemplars 
from two or more semantic categories. After that, instead of word stem completion, 
we asked them to form an intention to press the space bar whenever some specified 
intention cues would appear in a subsequent lexical decision task. These intention 
cues were selected from the memorized set. During the lexical decision task we 
measured accessibility of the intention cues, words that were semantically related to 
the intention cues (i.e. distracting cues), and control cues. In addition, we measured 
speed of intention execution (i.e. space bar presses). In both Experiments 3.1 and 3.2 
we showed that distracting cues were slower identified as words than both the 
intention cues and control cues. Furthermore, we found that the level of inhibition of 
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distracting cues was correlated with speed of intention execution. Together these 
results offer initial evidence for our idea that stimuli that could potentially interfere 
with the content of an intention (i.e. distracting stimuli) are indeed inhibited. 
 In Chapter 4 we focused on two questions that arose from the findings of 
Chapter 3. First of all, we examined whether inhibition of distracting stimuli is found 
when the measurement of the accessibility of the distracting information takes place 
before the intention needs to be executed. In addition, we investigated the nature of 
the inhibition of distracting stimuli after the formation of an intention. More 
specifically, we compared accessibility of distracting stimuli in episodic memory with 
accessibility in semantic memory. Because intentions are represented in episodic 
memory, as they deal with a particular place and time (i.e. one has to do something at 
a particular time when a specific opportunity arises), we hypothesized that it would be 
likely that stimuli that may potentially interfere with an intention are inhibited in 
episodic memory rather than semantic memory. 
 To test these ideas we modified the paradigm developed in Chapter 3 in two 
ways. Just as the experiments reported in Chapter 3 we first presented participants 
with exemplars from semantic categories (three categories in Experiment 4.1). Then 
we asked participants to form an intention to press the space bar whenever they would 
encounter one of six specific exemplars in the final phase of the experiment (i.e. in the 
intention execution phase). Before executing their intentions, however, we measured 
accessibility of intention cues, distracting cues and control cues with either a 
recognition task (tapping episodic memory) or a lexical decision task (tapping 
semantic memory). The data of Experiment 4.1 showed that intention cues were 
inhibited in the recognition task, but not in the lexical decision task. These results 
suggest that (a) distracting stimuli are inhibited in episodic memory only and (b) this 
inhibition is in effect immediately after intention formation (and thus before intention 
execution). 
In Chapter 5 we explored two possible moderators of the inhibition of 
distracting stimuli after intention formation to test whether the inhibition of 
distracting stimuli was indeed induced by an active (resource demanding) inhibitory 
process. Firstly, in Experiment 5.1, we examined whether depletion of cognitive 
resources leads to an inability to inhibit distracting information. We expected that it 
would, because active inhibitory processes are reliant on cognitive resources. In 
Experiment 5.1 participants performed a task that was similar to the recognition task 
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condition of Experiment 4.1. However, before starting this task some participants 
were asked to do a cognitive demanding task for one hour (which depleted their 
cognitive resources) while other participants were allowed to relax for one hour. 
Results showed that participants who were mentally fatigued did not show any 
inhibition of distracting stimuli compared with control stimuli, whereas this inhibition 
pattern was observed for the relaxed participants. Furthermore, for this latter group of 
participants we obtained a positive relation between level of inhibition of distracting 
stimuli and intention execution. These findings support our view that an inhibitory 
process causes inhibition of distracting stimuli and that this inhibition facilitates 
intention execution. 
Secondly, in Experiment 5.2, we examined whether inhibition of distracting 
stimuli would be released once an intention is completed. If the inhibition of 
distracting stimuli is indeed caused by an inhibitory process to prevent content of an 
online intention from interference, this inhibition should be lifted after intention 
completion. To test these ideas we presented participants with the recognition task 
condition from Experiment 4.1, but we manipulated the time of assessment of the 
recognition task. Some participants received the recognition task before the intention 
execution phase (uncompleted intention condition) and the other participants received 
the intention execution task after intention execution (completed intention condition). 
Consistent with our expectation participants in uncompleted intention condition 
showed inhibition of distracting stimuli, but participants in the completed intention 
condition did not. The results of Chapter 5 provide support for the existence of an 
active inhibitory mechanism that shields intentions from distraction. 
In the final chapter (Chapter 6), we discuss relations between the empirical 
chapters in detail and relate the findings to existing literature. Firstly, we explicate 
how our findings provide clear support for an inhibitory account of retrieval-induced 
forgetting. Given the great controversy concerning this explanation we think this 
support is important. Then we discuss the discrepancy between the nature of the 
inhibition obtained in Chapter 2 (episodic and semantic) with that obtained in Chapter 
4 (episodic only). Specifically, on the basis of Chapters 4 and 5 we present a modest 
reinterpretation of the conclusions reached in Chapter 3. Moreover, and more central 
to the aim of this dissertation, we discuss the contribution of the present research to 
our understanding of the mechanisms involved in the maintenance of intentions in 
memory. Taking the experiments described in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 together, we 
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conclude that there is convincing evidence that forming an intention leads to 
inhibition of distracting stimuli. Finally, we outline some strengths and weaknesses of 
the current dissertation and suggest some avenues for future research.  
 
 110 
  111  
Nederlandse Samenvatting
 
 
De mogelijkheid om een intentie te vormen die op een later tijdstip kan worden 
uitgevoerd, leidt ertoe dat menselijk gedrag bijzonder flexibel is. Het is nauwelijks 
voor te stellen hoe we zonder deze eigenschap zouden functioneren. Zo vormen we 
ons een intentie om naar een concert van de Rolling Stones te gaan, boeken te gaan 
lenen bij de bibliotheek, mensen uit te nodigen voor een feestje of boodschappen te 
gaan doen. Hoewel dergelijke intenties vaak succesvol ten uitvoer worden gebracht, 
gaat er echter ook wel eens wat mis. Soms vergeten we dat we ons überhaupt iets 
hadden voorgenomen en andere keren weten we wel dat we iets wilden gaan doen, 
maar niet meer precies wat. Dit is niet erg verbazingwekkend gezien het feit dat er 
meestal veel zaken zijn die ons af zouden kunnen leiden, waardoor we onze intenties 
vergeten. Aan de andere kant is het natuurlijk wel zo dat we vaak onze intenties 
succesvol ten uitvoer brengen. Dit proefschrift gaat over de vraag hoe mensen in staat 
zijn een accurate herinnering van een intentie in het geheugen te houden, met name 
als er veel afleiding in de omgeving aanwezig is. 
 Om deze vraag te onderzoeken hebben we het geheugen voor informatie die te 
maken heeft met intenties onderzocht. We hebben ons hierbij vooral gericht op wat er 
in het geheugen gebeurt met stimuli die ons af zouden kunnen leiden. Onze hypothese 
was dat afleidende stimuli in het geheugen zouden worden weggedrukt (geïnhibeerd). 
Deze inhibitie van afleidende stimuli zou bovendien functioneel kunnen zijn in de zin 
dat het hierdoor gemakkelijker wordt om een intentie te onthouden. 
 We hebben dit idee onderzocht in twee stappen. Ten eerste hebben we 
onderzocht wat er gebeurt met afleidende informatie wanneer je informatie ophaalt uit 
je langetermijngeheugen. Het idee achter deze eerste stap is dat je bij het ophalen van 
informatie uit je geheugen vaak afleidende informatie moet inhiberen (bijvoorbeeld 
wanneer je je auto zoekt op de parkeerplaats bij je werk, is het belangrijk de 
parkeerplek van gisteren tijdelijk uit je geheugen weg te drukken) net als bij het 
onthouden van een intentie. We beginnen ons onderzoek op het gebied van het 
ophalen van informatie uit het geheugen, aangezien er een grote onderzoekstraditie 
over vergeten van afleidende informatie tijdens dit ophalen bestaat met het zogeheten 
retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF) paradigma. Tot nu toe was het onduidelijk of dit 
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zogenaamde vergeten van afleidende informatie inderdaad door inhibitie komt. 
Wanneer we kunnen aantonen dat er inderdaad sprake is van inhibitie in het RIF-
paradigma, kunnen we dat paradigma als uitgangspunt nemen om experimenten te 
ontwikkelen die de vraag moet beantwoorden of het vormen van een intentie ook tot 
inhibitie van afleidende stimuli leidt. Zodoende onderzoeken we in stap 1 (hoofdstuk 
2) of er bij het ophalen van informatie uit het langetermijngeheugen inderdaad sprake 
is van inhibitie van afleidende stimuli. Vervolgens (stap 2; in hoofdstukken 3 – 5) 
passen we dit paradigma aan om te testen of er een vergelijkbaar mechanisme bestaat 
dat afleidende stimuli inhibeert na het vormen van een intentie.  
 In Hoofdstuk 2 voerden we 2 experimenten uit om te onderzoeken of het 
ophalen van informatie uit het langetermijngeheugen leidt tot inhibitie van afleidende 
informatie met behulp van het RIF paradigma. In het RIF-paradigma wordt aan 
proefpersonen gevraagd woorden te onthouden van twee of meer semantische 
categorieën (bijvoorbeeld FRUIT – mango, FRUIT – perzik, DIER – giraf, DIER – 
schaap). Daarna wordt aan hen gevraagd om een selectie van deze bestudeerde 
woorden op te halen aan de hand van het completeren van woordstammen 
(bijvoorbeeld FRUIT – ma...). Tenslotte wordt de toegankelijkheid van alle 
bestudeerde woorden gemeten met behulp van een herkenningstaak (Experiment 2.1) 
en een lexicale beslissingstaak (Experiment 2.2). De hypothese was dat woorden die 
semantisch gerelateerd zijn aan de opgehaalde woorden (afleidende woorden; in dit 
voorbeeld perzik) minder toegankelijk zouden zijn dan (a) opgehaalde woorden (in dit 
voorbeeld mango) en (b) neutrale woorden (in dit voorbeeld giraf en schaap). 
 Uit de resultaten van Experiment 2.1 bleek inderdaad dat afleidende stimuli 
langzamer werden herkend dan woorden die bestudeerd waren in de eerste fase, zowel 
vergeleken met de opgehaalde woorden als de neutrale woorden. In Experiment 2.2 
vonden we hetzelfde patroon, maar dit keer op een lexicale beslissingstaak. Dit is de 
eerste keer dat RIF gevonden is op een impliciete geheugentaak. De resultaten in 
Hoofdstuk 2 bieden directe steun voor het idee dat stimuli die je zouden kunnen 
afleiden (in dit geval bij het ophalen van een woord) worden geïnhibeerd. Op basis 
van deze resultaten concluderen we dat er inhibitoire processen in het 
langetermijngeheugen bestaan die afleidende stimuli kunnen wegdrukken. 
 In Hoofdstuk 3 pasten we het RIF-paradigma zodanig aan dat we konden 
onderzoeken of het vormen van een intentie voldoende was om afleidende stimuli te 
inhiberen. Net als in Hoofdstuk 2 vroegen we de proefpersonen eerst om woorden te 
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bestuderen van twee of meer semantische categorieën (bijvoorbeeld FRUIT – mango, 
FRUIT – perzik, DIER – giraf, DIER – schaap). Vervolgens vroegen we ze om een 
intentie te vormen om, in de lexicale beslissingstaak die zou volgen, op de spatiebalk 
te drukken na de lexicale beslissing van sommige van de bestudeerde woorden 
(bijvoorbeeld mango). Door deze manipulatie ontstonden intentie woorden (in dit 
voorbeeld mango), afleidende woorden (in dit voorbeeld perzik) en neutrale woorden 
(in dit voorbeeld giraf en schaap). Na het vormen van de intentie kregen de 
proefpersonen de lexicale beslissingstaak waarin (a) de toegankelijkheid van deze 
woorden werd gemeten (snelheid van de lexicale beslissing op de woorden) en (b) de 
snelheid van het uitvoeren van de intentie (het indrukken van de spatiebalk na de 
lexicale beslissing op intentie woorden). 
 Uit twee experimenten (Experimenten 3.1 en 3.2) met dit paradigma bleek dat 
afleidende woorden langzamer werden herkend dan intentie woorden en neutrale 
woorden. Bovendien bleek de mate van verminderde toegankelijkheid (inhibitie) van 
afleidende woorden positief te correleren met de snelheid van het uitvoeren van de 
intentie. Deze bevindingen bieden steun aan het idee dat stimuli die zouden kunnen 
interfereren met een intentie inderdaad worden geïnhibeerd. 
 In Hoofdstuk 4 richtten we ons op twee vragen die opgeroepen worden door 
de resultaten uit Hoofdstuk 3. Ten eerste hebben we onderzocht of de inhibitie van 
afleidende stimuli ook kan worden aangetoond wanneer de meting van de 
toegankelijkheid van deze afleidende stimuli al plaatsvindt voordat de intentie werd 
uitgevoerd. Verder hebben we onderzocht of de inhibitie van afleidende woorden 
episodisch of semantisch van aard is. Aangezien intenties episodische 
geheugenrepresentaties zijn (ze betrekking hebben op een specifieke plaats en tijd) 
verwachtten we dat deze afleidende stimuli met name in het episodisch geheugen 
geïnhibeerd zouden raken. 
 Om deze ideeën te toetsen pasten we het paradigma uit Hoofdstuk 3 op twee 
manieren aan. Net als de experimenten uit Hoofdstuk 3 kregen proefpersonen eerst 
woorden te zien uit semantische categorieën. Daarna vroegen we proefpersonen weer 
om een intentie te vormen om bij sommige van die woorden op de spatiebalk te 
drukken in een taak die zou volgen. Voordat ze deze intentie konden uitvoeren werd 
echter eerst de toegankelijkheid gemeten van de intentie woorden, de afleidende 
woorden en de neutrale woorden. Dit werd ofwel gemeten in een herkenningstaak (die 
de toegankelijkheid meet in het episodisch geheugen), ofwel een lexicale 
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beslissingstaak (die de toegankelijkheid meet in het semantisch geheugen). Uit 
Experiment 4.1 blijkt dat de afleidende woorden verminderd toegankelijk waren in de 
herkenningstaak, maar niet in de lexicale beslissingstaak. De resultaten uit 
Experiment 4.1 laten zien dat (a) afleidende stimuli geïnhibeerd zijn in het episodisch 
geheugen en (b) dit effect al aanwezig is voordat de intentie wordt uitgevoerd. 
 In Hoofdstuk 5 zochten we naar twee moderatoren van de inhibitie van 
afleidende stimuli om te testen of deze inhibitie veroorzaakt wordt door een actief 
inhibitoir proces (een proces dat capaciteit kost). In Experiment 5.1 hebben we 
onderzocht of het uitputten van cognitieve bronnen (door mensen cognitief moe te 
maken) leidt tot een reductie van de capaciteit om afleidende stimuli te inhiberen. De 
proefpersonen kregen dezelfde taak als in Experiment 4.1 (met als 
toegankelijkheidsmeting de herkenningstaak), maar voor ze met deze taak begonnen 
werden ze of cognitief moe gemaakt (door een uur lang rekensommen op te lossen) of 
mochten ze zich een uur lang ontspannen. Uit de resultaten bleek dat de 
proefpersonen die moe waren geen inhibitie van afleidende woorden vertoonden, 
terwijl dit bij de ontspannen proefpersonen wel het geval was. Bovendien bleek dat er 
bij deze laatste groep proefpersonen een positieve relatie was tussen de mate van 
inhibite van afleidende stimuli en het uitvoeren van de intentie. Deze resultaten 
bieden steun aan het idee dat een actief inhibitoir proces verantwoordelijk is voor de 
inhibitie van afleidende stimuli en dat deze inhibitie het uitvoeren van intenties 
faciliteert. 
 Vervolgens hebben we in Experiment 5.2 onderzocht of inhibitie van 
afleidende stimuli zou wegvallen wanneer een intentie is uitgevoerd. Een dergelijk 
patroon zou impliceren dat de afleidende stimuli worden geïnhibeerd om de 
uitvoering van intenties te beschermen. Om dit idee te toetsen kregen proefpersonen 
dezelfde taak als in Experiment 4.1 (met als meting van toegankelijkheid de 
herkenningstaak), maar dit keer manipuleerden we de volgorde van het meten van de 
toegankelijkheid van de stimuli: De toegankelijkheid werd ofwel gemeten voor het 
uitvoeren van de intentie (zie Experimenten 4.1 en 5.1), ofwel erna. Consistent met 
onze verwachting bleek dat de inhibitie van afleidende stimuli afwezig was na het 
uitvoeren van de intentie. De experimenten uit Hoofdstuk 5 bieden samen steun aan 
het idee dat inhibitie van afleidende stimuli geïnduceerd wordt door een actief 
inhibitoir mechanisme en dat dit mechanisme ervoor zorgt dat uit te voeren intenties 
worden beschermd tegen afleiding in het geheugen. 
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 In het zesde en laatste hoofdstuk integreren we de empirische hoofdstukken en 
relateren we de bevindingen aan de bestaande literatuur. Om te beginnen beschrijven 
we hoe onze resultaten bewijs vormen voor het bestaan van inhibitie in het RIF-
paradigma. Aangezien het al dan niet bestaan van een inhibitoir proces in het RIF-
paradigma veel aandacht krijgt in recente artikelen over RIF, denken wij dat dit 
bewijs een belangrijke bijdrage aan dit wetenschapsgebied is. Verder besteden we 
aandacht aan de discrepantie tussen de aard van inhibitie in het RIF-paradigma in 
Hoofdstuk 2 (episodisch en semantisch) en inhibitie als gevolg van intentievorming in 
Hoofdstuk 4 (alleen episodische inhibitie). Bij het bespreken van deze discrepantie 
betrekken we ook Hoofdstuk 3, waarin sprake leek te zijn van semantische inhibitie, 
maar herinterpreteren we de data van Hoofdstuk 3 op basis van de bevindingen in 
Hoofdstuk 4. Na deze intergratie bespreken we hoe het gerapporteerde onderzoek 
bijdraagt aan kennis over de mechanismen die ten grondslag liggen aan het onthouden 
van intenties. Op basis van de experimenten in de hoofdstukken 3 tot en met 5 
concluderen we dat er overtuigend bewijs is voor het idee dat het vormen van een 
intentie leidt tot inhibitie van stimuli die zouden kunnen interfereren met de inhoud 
van deze intentie. Ten slotte bespreken we nog enkele sterke en zwakke punten van 
dit proefschrift en behandelen we enkele suggesties voor toekomstig onderzoek. 
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